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Introduction
Modern biomedical science is capable of giving people more choice than ever before about what their 
future children will be like.  Embryo selection techniques, for example, can enable people to choose the 
sex of their child, to avoid the birth of a child with a disability, or even to choose deliberately to create a 
disabled child.  Such possibilities raise important ethical issues – questions about which of these choices, 
if any, are morally wrong – along with closely related questions about the extent to which law and regulation 
should restrict these areas of medicine.  Each of the four essays in this volume tackles such questions. 
Specifically:
 (1)  What is eugenics?  Which, if any, of our current practices actually are eugenic?  Is ‘eugenics’ a   
  helpful term to use when discussing human reproduction?
 (2)  What moral objections are there to using embryo selection techniques to avoid disease and   
  disability in our children?  Are any of these objections really sound?
 (3)  Should people who positively want to have a child with a disability (some members of the Deaf   
  community, for example) be allowed to use embryo selection to achieve this?
 (4)  Is choosing the sex of your future child wrong? Are there any circumstances in which people   
  should be allowed to do this?
Our approach to these questions is broadly philosophical: we use the methods distinctive to philosophy 
to address these issues.  So first we seek to elucidate the moral principles which are appealed to in 
these debates (such as the idea that we have an obligation to create the ‘best possible’ children, or that 
children should be treated as ‘gifts’), and aim to evaluate these principles by spelling out their implications 
and looking at the extent to which they cohere with other beliefs, policies, and values.  Second, we seek 
to uncover the form or structure of people’s ethical arguments or reasoning.  Third, we analyse these 
arguments to see which are valid and which are confused or mistaken.  Finally, we seek to explain what 
some of the key terms in the debate mean and how they’re used – for example, what’s meant by ‘eugenics’, 
or by ‘sexism’.
As philosophers, we’re generally more interested in the structure and workings of people’s moral arguments 
than in defending particular policy positions.  So while we do often conclude by saying that certain actions 
or policies are, or are not, defensible such conclusions are not the most important thing.  Rather, it’s 
the illumination of arguments, concepts, and principles that is our more fundamental aim.  Some of the 
conclusions that we arrive at, such as the suggestion that there are circumstances in which prospective 
parents should be allowed to select their child’s sex, or allowed deliberately to create a child with a 
disability, are controversial and our readers may well not agree.  Nonetheless, even when our conclusions 
are not accepted, we would still hope to have improved the quality of the debate, and of the way we think 
about these issues, by investigating whether even some rather unpopular ethical positions may not be as 
indefensible or abhorrent as they at first appear, and conversely whether some commonly used arguments 
are in fact flawed.
We can all learn a great deal from respectful open-minded ethical debate and we very much hope that 
these papers will help to promote this.
Eugenics and the Ethics of Selective Reproduction
The Language of
Eugenics
Stephen Wilkinson and Eve Garrard
Eugenics is commonly cited as a major concern 
about, and objection to, contemporary genetic and 
reproductive science, but there is a lot of confusion 
and disagreement about what exactly ‘eugenics’ 
means. 
This is regrettable, and the stakes are high, since 
contemporary genetic and reproductive science 
is capable of delivering substantial benefits to 
humankind.  So if we allow its development to be 
held back by unsound objections, based around 
vague worries about ‘eugenics’, unnecessary 
and unjustified harm may be inflicted on those 
who stand to benefit from new interventions.  On 
the other hand, if there really are sound eugenics 
arguments in play then we need these to be clearly 
and unambiguously articulated.  Only then will we 
know which technologies to ban or restrictively 
regulate, and understand properly the reasons for 
doing so.  This is vital if we are to avoid permitting 
or encouraging dangerous or unethical eugenic 
practices.
So what exactly is eugenics?  Why do so many 
people find it so objectionable?  Is calling a 
practice ‘eugenics’ so contentious, so derogatory, 
that really we should just give up on using the term 
at all – should we stop talking about eugenics 
altogether, and find some other way of describing 
the medical and social practices which we want to 
discuss?  Each of these three questions is tightly 
connected to the other two, and though we’ll be 
focussing on the third question here, in order to 
deal with it properly we’ll have to spend some time 
on the other two questions first.
What is eugenics?
To begin with, we need some idea of what eugenics 
actually is – we need a good definition.  There are 
various different definitions of eugenics, but the 
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The Language of Eugenics
Eugenics is the attempt to improve the 
human gene pool.3  People can agree on that 
definition, even if they disagree considerably 
about what counts as eugenics.4
Advances in PGD … are tending 
towards a new era of eugenics.  
Unlike the State sponsored eugenics 
of the Nazi era, this new eugenics is 
an individual market-based eugenics, 
where children are increasingly 
regarded as made-to-order consumer 
products.1 
On the face of it, it would seem 
laudable to prevent a baby having 
a disabling condition, but there are 
some challenging realities to the PGD 
procedure. It is not simply a case of 
‘preventing’ the disabling condition. 
In PGD, early human embryos are 
examined under the microscope. 
Those who are affected by the 
disabling condition in question are 
immediately discarded (i.e. thrown 
away). One of those not affected is 
then implanted in the mother’s 
womb. The eugenic philosophy 
behind the procedure is clear. Those 
who have a disability will always be 
thrown away.2 
Tania Simoncelli, ‘Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis 
and Selection: from disease prevention to customised 
conception’, Different Takes, No.24 (Spring 2003).
http://genetics.live.radicaldesigns.org/downloads/200303_
difftakes_simoncelli.pdf
Alison Davis, letter to The Daily Mail, June 10th 2008.
Ruth Chadwick, ‘Genetics and Ethics’, in Edward Craig 
(ed.), The Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1998).
One objection to this definition is that it has intention built 
into it whereas, some people suggest, eugenics can occur 
even if no one intends to alter the ‘gene pool’.  Being eugenic 
could, on this view, be an emergent property of a system: 
e.g. a system in which individuals have a great deal of 
reproductive choice, don’t generally have eugenic aims, but 
yet act together (unintentionally) in ways that are similar in 
their effects to intentionally eugenic acts.
Our reply to this is that unless intention is built into the 
definition of ‘eugenics’, it will be difficult to distinguish 
between eugenics (thought of as the deliberate alteration 
of the genetic makeup of a population) and unintended 
natural processes, notably evolution through ordinary sexual 
reproduction and natural selection – and we don’t want to 
end up having to say that the latter are eugenic.
Also, at least some of the supposed ethical significance of 
the idea of eugenics (which is what interests us here) is reliant 
on its being intentional: the thought being that deliberately 
altering humanity’s genetic makeup is more morally 
problematic, or morally controversial, than merely allowing 
natural or social evolution to run its course.
And they do disagree about this: one of the things 
they disagree about is the significance of parental 
choice in the matter, with some people believing 
that only procedures enforced by the state, using 
authoritarian coercive methods, can really be 
classed as eugenics, so that if there’s free parental 
choice (so-called ‘liberal eugenics’) that won’t really 
be eugenics at all.  But other people think that some 
procedures which prospective parents can choose, 
such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), 
with embryo testing and the subsequent disposal 
or donation of unwanted embryos, are clearly 
cases of eugenics, even where events are entirely 
a matter of parental preference and there’s no state 
coercion at all.5 
As well as disagreeing about the methods which 
a selective reproductive practice must have in 
order to count as eugenics, people also disagree 
about what the aim of the practice must be if it’s 
rightly to be classified as eugenic.  The aim of 
selective reproductive practices can be to reduce 
undesirable traits, such as genetic disease, or it can 
be to increase purportedly desirable ones, such 
as athletic ability or effective immune systems or 
intelligence.  Some people think that only the latter 
counts as eugenics: in their view, it’s the attempt to 
enhance children, to create ‘supernormal’ (better 
than normal) individuals with cognitive or physical 
capacities above the normal range of functioning, 
which is really what eugenics amounts to, and 
attempts merely to avoid disease or ‘subnormal’ 
traits aren’t eugenics at all.  But others see the 
difference between avoiding disability on the 
one hand, and enhancing ability on the other, as 
occurring within the general practice of eugenics. 
On this view, the practice of eugenics is divided 
into two different categories - positive eugenics 
aiming at enhancement, and negative eugenics 
aiming at the elimination of disease and disability.6
So these two distinctions – authoritarian versus 
liberal methods, and negative versus positive 
aims – can be treated in two very different 
ways.   They can be treated broadly, where both 
terms in each distinction are seen as differing 
forms of eugenics.  On this view, there can be 
authoritarian eugenics and liberal eugenics; there 
can be positive eugenics and there can be negative 
eugenics.  Alternatively, eugenics can be given a 
narrow treatment, which insists that it’s confined 
to one term only of each distinction: eugenics 
involves authoritarian methods, say, rather than 
parental choice; it involves enhancement, rather 
than elimination of disability or disease.  In some 
cases, the decision about how broadly or narrowly 
to treat these distinctions may be a political 
choice about what usage is most effective. So, for 
example, people who wish to dissociate parental 
reproductive choice from eugenics may claim that, 
in order for something to count as eugenic, it has 
to involve State coercion.  Conversely, those who 
wish to restrict parental reproductive choice may 
take a more expansive view of eugenics, arguing 
that it can occur even if no coercion is involved.7
Finally, some people want ‘eugenics’ to be a moral 
term, to have wrongness built into it, so that to call 
something ‘eugenics’ is inevitably to condemn it; 
while others want it to be a more neutral term that 
leaves open the possibility that eugenic practices 
may in some circumstances be appropriate and 
justifiable.  The advantage of having a morally 
neutral definition of ‘eugenics’ is that it leaves room 
for discussion about whether or not any form of 
eugenics can be morally right.  A morally loaded 
definition, that has wrongness built in, won’t 
allow us to do this – if we define eugenics as, say, 
‘morally unjustified attempts to improve the gene 
pool’ then we won’t be able to consider whether 
any particular case of eugenics might be morally 
right. By categorising it as ‘eugenics’ we’ll already 
have determined that it’s wrong.8 
So if we want to leave the issue of whether eugenics 
can ever be justified open for consideration, we 
need to find a definition of what eugenics is that’s 
neutral about whether it’s right or it’s wrong. If we 
don’t have that kind of definition it’s hard to see 
how people with different views about the morality 






‘Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is a technique 
that enables people with a specific inherited condition in 
their family to avoid passing it on to their children. It involves 
checking the genes of embryos created through IVF for this 
genetic condition.’  Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, http://www.hfea.gov.uk/preimplantation-genetic-
diagnosis.html#1.
Habermas apparently takes the former view, contrasting 
‘‘the prevention of the birth of a severely afflicted child’’ with 
‘‘eugenic choice’’. Jürgen Habermas, The future of human 
nature (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), p21.
Those who wish to restrict parental reproductive choice may 
instead concede that, in order for something to be a case of 
eugenics, there must be a degree of involuntariness (caused 
by coercion, deception, or manipulation) – and then go on 
to argue that what appears to be voluntary reproductive 
choice often isn’t in fact voluntary.  This could be because 
of misinformation or subtle forms of pressure exerted on the 
choosers.
We suggest a ‘case by case ‘approach to this line of argument. 
It will almost certainly be true of some cases of parental 
reproductive choice, but it is difficult to say in advance, or in 
the abstract, whether this applies to many or most cases, or 
to just a few.
Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s Children: the ethics 






of eugenics can even be sure that they’re talking 
about the same thing.  For these reasons, ‘the 
attempt to improve the human gene pool’ is a 
reasonably satisfactory definition of eugenics, 
since it leaves open the issue of whether we’re 
morally justified in making any such attempt.
Why do so many people think that 
eugenics is wrong?
There can be general agreement on the definition 
of ‘eugenics’ as the attempt to improve the human 
gene pool, even among people whose views 
about the morality of eugenics differ widely.  But 
why exactly is it that some people find eugenics 
so morally objectionable?  One major cause of 
this is a very understandable one: the infamous 
Nazi eugenic practices – involving mass murder 
by the State of targets ranging from children with 
disabilities to whole ethnic populations – were so 
horrifying that they gave eugenics a very bad name 
indeed, so that now to label a practice ‘eugenic’ 
is to suggest immediately that there’s something 
wrong with it.  
However the assumption that eugenics must be 
authoritarian is surely misplaced. There are many 
different methods by which selective reproduction 
aiming to improve the gene pool can in principle 
happen, ranging from gamete or embryo selection 
to selective abortion, the voluntary sterilisation of 
adults, the coerced sterilisation of adults, selective 
infanticide, or even the selective killing of adults. 
These various methods differ enormously in the 
degree to which they are authoritarian, and clearly 
raise very different kinds of moral issues.  Some are 
among the worst crimes that can be committed. 
However we can’t just take it for granted that all 
forms of eugenic selective reproduction are like that 
– other methods prevent the birth of children with 
terrible disorders, who would have been doomed 
to early and painful deaths, and it’s not obvious 
that that is an immoral thing to do. Although force 
and coercion in these matters must always be 
condemned, we can’t simply assume that practices 
such as PGD should share that condemnation, 
since they needn’t in any way involve authoritarian 
methods.  If we want to condemn PGD, it can’t be 
on the grounds of authoritarian methods, since 
such methods need never be used, and would 
indeed be prohibited in any broadly liberal social 
system.
In the midst of all this disagreement about the extent 
and justifiability of eugenics, there is however one 
claim about which there is widespread consensus: 
everyone accepts that ‘eugenics’ is always a very 
emotive term.  A series of interviews with experts 
and stakeholders conducted in 2005 showed this 
very clearly.9  Not surprisingly, the most enthusiastic 
users of the term were people who are critical of 
reproductive and selection technologies:
On the other side, those with what might be termed 
‘pro-choice’ or ‘pro-science’ views generally avoid 
the word:
9
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This tainting of the term, this automatic 
association with authoritarian coercive 
methods, means that those who support a 
biomedical practice such as PGD may very 
likely want to prevent it being regarded as 
eugenic.  In contrast those who condemn PGD 
may well want to label it in this hostile way, 
and may welcome the association with utterly 
unjustifiable Nazi practices, since they regard 
PGD itself as also being entirely unjustifiable.
We use it [‘eugenics’] whenever we 
can  and we won’t be distracted or 
diverted into using any other word, 
not least because it’s not a popular 
word. It’s not a word that people 
like to hear; it’s got a lot of nasty 
connotations. So we’re not going to 
try to find a more palatable word.
(Campaigner) 
I almost think that we should ban the 
term. If you just say ‘eugenic’ nobody 
knows what you mean. We should 
say what it is about the statement 
or the policies that we object to, 
and examine that. It’s like saying 
‘you’re a fascist!’ It’s an unexamined 
assertation that’s used for rhetorical 
effect, so it just seems lazy to me. 
It’s not a coherent or well-specified 
critique. And it’s very insulting to 
doctors...        (Academic)
See Stephen Wilkinson, ‘“Eugenics talk” and the language 
of bioethics’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 2008, 34(6), 467-
471; Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s Children: the 
ethics of selective reproduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010): chapter 6.
So nearly everyone agrees that ‘eugenics’ is 
a profoundly emotive and negative term. But 
whereas for some this is a reason to avoid it, so 
that its awful connotations won’t become attached 
to biomedical techniques they approve of, for 
others the use of the word ‘eugenics’ is a good way 
of getting across their negative message about 
practices they regard as deeply objectionable.  This 
suggests that ‘eugenics’ may be such an emotive 
and politicised term that its use is unlikely to foster 
a calm and rational exchange of views between 
those with different perspectives or positions.
So, in the light of this, should we simply abandon 
the term altogether when discussing the ethics of 
selective reproduction?
Should we stop talking about eugenics?
This is the central question: should we give up using 
this term altogether?  To answer this question, we 
need to think about what general reasons might be 
given for abandoning the use of any particular term 
in bioethics.  There are three general proposals 
which we might consider, to see if they offer us 
convincing reasons for getting rid of the language 
of eugenics from our discussions.
(We mustn’t be prepared to give up a word simply 
because it causes unreasonable offence, for that 
would mean that our language was entirely at the 
mercy of anyone who wanted to take offence, 
however groundlessly.)
The use of such terms may thereby fail to respect 
people’s autonomy – that is, their ability to reflect 
and consider and choose for themselves.
If any of these proposals is to amount to a convincing 
argument for abandoning eugenics talk, it needs to 
be neutral about the moral rightness or wrongness 
of particular reproductive practices.  Why?   There 
are at least two reasons for wanting morally neutral 
proposals about how we should use our terms. 
First, if arguments about terminology such as 
‘eugenics’ depend on particular moral views, then 
in areas such as reproductive ethics, where there’s 
widespread moral disagreement, there won’t be any 
prospect of people agreeing on the terms in which 
the debate should be conducted. This means that 
each side will use its own partisan concepts and 
terms—a situation which will make clear balanced 
debate very difficult.  Very often when we’re having 
a debate about the rightness or wrongness of a 
particular biomedical procedure the first thing we 
have to do is to make sure that we’re all using 
words in the same way, with the same meanings.  If 
we aren’t, then there’s little hope of our being able 
to reach any rational resolution – we’ll simply be 
talking past each other much of the time.  Perhaps 
there are occasions when we can’t escape the use 
of morally loaded language in our debates, but we 
should at least make some attempt to avoid it in 
areas where there’s genuine room for, and need of, 
further debate.
The second reason for wanting a morally neutral 
proposal about whether to abandon talk of eugenics 
is that people who are genuinely unsure about 
how to answer substantive moral questions about 
whether a supposedly eugenic practice is right 
or wrong still have to decide what concepts and 
terms to use, and it doesn’t help them to be offered 
nothing but competing partisan terminologies. 
(This kind of problem arises frequently in the 
debates about abortion, where people may for 
example have to decide whether to talk about ‘the 
fetus’ or about ‘the unborn child’, and in so doing 
may find themselves using terminology which is 
already covertly partisan.)
So we’re looking to see if there’s a reason against 
using the language of eugenics which doesn’t in 
itself presuppose any particular answers to the 
moral questions in which such talk is used, such 
as the question of whether eugenics can ever 
be morally justified, or whether PGD is a case of 
eugenics.
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First proposal: 
We should abandon a term if using it gives 
offence, at least where the offence is 
reasonable.
Second proposal:  
We should abandon a term if it’s used to 
make statements, even true ones, which are 
misleading.
Third proposal:  
We should abandon a term if using it, perhaps 
by being emotive or manipulative, encourages 
people to form beliefs irrationally and non-
autonomously.  
I think on any occasion when the 
issue might be raised there would 
probably be a desire to avoid using 
[the term ‘eugenics’] because of its 
pejorative connotations. It suggests 
Nazis before we even start to consider 
the issues.    
(Healthcare Professional) 
First, the proposal that we should avoid talk of 
eugenics if it gives (reasonable) offence:
The term ‘eugenics’ is indeed likely to give offence, 
first and foremost to the healthcare professionals 
who are engaging in any practice being called 
‘eugenics’.  The negative connotations of the 
term are likely to spill over on to anyone whose 
activities are labelled eugenic. The use of this term 
for biomedical practices such as PGD may also 
give offence to surviving victims of Nazi eugenic 
practices, or their relatives, who might feel that 
Nazi atrocities are trivialised by putting them in the 
same category as procedures such as PGD.10 
However this argument from offence only requires 
us to consider reasonable offence, since otherwise 
irrational offence-taking might be able to muzzle 
the use of many medical terms.  Someone might be 
offended at having her proposed medical treatment 
classed as ‘minor surgery’, on the grounds that it’s 
very important to her and she feels very strongly 
about it.  But this wouldn’t be a good reason for 
abandoning the use of the term ‘minor surgery’ - 
it’s unreasonable to suppose that the classification 
of surgical practices into minor and major should 
depend on how strongly a particular patient feels 
about them, and her offence at the use of the 
classification is an irrational offence.
So what would it take for someone to be offended 
by being labelled a ‘eugenicist’, and crucially 
for this reaction (being or feeling offended) to 
be reasonable?  One thing that could make the 
offence reasonable is if the allegation of ‘eugenics’ 
were untrue; someone could take offence, and 
reasonably so, if they were falsely accused of 
practising eugenics.  One problem that this raises is 
that, given how contentious defining and applying 
the term ‘eugenics’ can be, it will often be very 
difficult settle the question of which accusations 
are false, and therefore which cases of offence are 
reasonable.
False accusation is however not the only thing 
that can give rise to reasonable offence.  There are 
also cases where it’s reasonable to take offence at 
the application of a term even if it’s used to make 
statements that are, in one sense, true.  These 
include instances where the descriptively accurate 
terminology used is nonetheless hateful – such as 
the use of the term ‘whore’ to refer to a sex worker, 
or much of the sorry litany of racist hate speech, 
or when someone who is in fact obese is called 
‘fat’.  These cases can be complex but normally 
what’s going on is that some kind of (mistaken or 
unfounded or just rude) evaluative judgement is 
implied by the statement.  This is perhaps most 
clear in the case of racist hate speech and may 
also apply to calling someone a ‘whore’ or ‘fat’ in 
certain contexts.  For this reason, calling someone 
a ‘black x’ or a ‘fat x’ cannot usually be justified 
merely by citing the fact that the person really is 
black or fat, even if the person would apply those 
terms to themselves.
So, turning back to eugenics, a second way in 
which someone (a doctor, or a parent exercising 
reproductive choice, for example) could be 
reasonably offended at being called a ‘eugenicist’ 
is if that label implied something further which was 
itself false or unjustified: such as that they have evil 
intentions (when they don’t), or that they subscribe 
to Nazi ideologies (when they don’t).  And this may 
apply even if the person accused of eugenics is, 
at least in a descriptive or technical sense, really 
practising eugenics.
What both types of reasonable offence have in 
common is that something untrue is being said 
or implied.  In the first case, what’s said is itself 
untrue: calling the person a eugenicist is a false 
accusation.  In the second case, ‘eugenics’ is not 
strictly a false accusation but (arguably) it is still 
misleading because it suggests or implies some 
further statement which is itself false or unjustified, 
which takes us onto the next proposal (below) 
concerning misleadingness.
Second, the claim that we should avoid talking 
about eugenics because it’s liable to be misleading:
What this proposal amounts to is that even if PGD 
is technically a form of eugenics, we shouldn’t say 
so, because the public will be misled into thinking 
that people practising PGD are doing something 
that they’re not (e.g. behaving like Nazis).
However, those who think that PGD is wrong won’t 
necessarily agree that this outcome is misleading, 
since they believe that PGD is in fact significantly 
akin to (some) Nazi practices. So we can’t settle 
whether the use of the term ‘eugenics’ is misleading 
without settling the substantive question about 
whether PGD is eugenic – that is, we need to 
know whether the claim that PGD is eugenics 
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10 We also note here that euphemism can cause offence. 
When, for instance, a manager refers to what is essentially 
a programme of cuts and redundancies as ‘cost savings’, 
‘restructuring’, or ‘rationalisation’, employees often find 
this language morally repugnant, owing to the dishonesty 
involved in using such terms to mask the true nature of 
what’s happening. Someone could make the same point 
about eugenics.  If a practice really is eugenics and yet it 
is described (for example) as ‘parental choice’ or ‘public 
health’, this may seem offensively euphemistic to some. 
Arguments from (reasonable) offence therefore can ‘cut both 
ways’; they may count either in favour of or against using 
particular terms.  This is hardly surprising given the many and 
varied range of things that might cause reasonable) offence.
is true or false.  So the claim that the use of the 
term ‘eugenics’ is misleading isn’t morally neutral: 
it will only be accepted by those who think that 
there’s nothing morally wrong with practices such 
as PGD.  Those who object to such practices will 
think there’s nothing misleading about calling them 
‘eugenic’.  So suggesting that we should abandon 
the term ‘eugenics’ because it’s misleading is no 
more convincing, because no more neutral, than 
the suggestion that we should abandon it because 
it’s offensive.
A different reason for thinking that talk of eugenics 
is misleading derives from the fact that there is a 
great deal of disagreement about what the term 
means, and so people are liable to talk past each 
other and get confused if they use the term.11 But 
we can always get people to define their terms, to 
say exactly what they mean, in order to avoid just 
this sort of confusion.  And, in any case, there are 
many ethically loaded terms about which there is 
also a great deal of confusion and disagreement 
among users. One of the most notable examples 
is euthanasia, where people often disagree about 
whether a particular procedure is really euthanasia, 
or whether it’s just a case of ‘letting the patient die’ 
or ‘letting nature take its course’.  Some people 
think that only deliberately and actively killing a 
patient (for her own supposed good) counts as 
euthanasia; others point out that it’s hard to see a 
morally significant difference between deliberately 
killing a patient, and deliberately letting her die when 
we could save her life, so long as both are done 
for the patient’s own good.  If one is euthanasia, 
on this view, then so is the other. Another example 
about which people often disagree is the phrase 
‘informed consent’ – what one person regards 
as a genuine consent sufficient to legitimise an 
invasive medical procedure (‘She signed on the 
dotted line, didn’t she?’) another person may 
think of as so uninformed as to be incapable of 
legitimising anything.  If we gave up using all the 
bioethical terms about which there’s disagreement 
or confusion we’d have a very impoverished 
vocabulary indeed.  So again, even if the use of 
the term is misleading because of disagreements 
and confusion, this doesn’t seem to give us a good 
reason to completely abandon the term ‘eugenics’.
Third, the claim that talk of eugenics fails to respect 
people’s autonomy, because it encourages people 
to form beliefs in a non-autonomous way:
What does this assertion amount to?  The heart of 
it seems to be that
Such depictions have so strong an effect on the 
viewer that they’re very ready to believe that such 
things must be wrong, without leaving room for 
critical rational thought about the matter. (Such 
things may indeed be wrong; the problem here 
is that people come to believe that they’re wrong 
without using their powers of reason properly.) 
Because of the association with terrible Nazi 
practices, the use of the term ‘eugenics’ arguably 
now has a similar kind of effect; it can undermine 
people’s autonomy by influencing their beliefs 
without the use of reason.  In doing this, it fails to 
respect their autonomy.
This proposal seems stronger than the first two 
which we considered, since foisting beliefs on 
people by circumventing their critical and rational 
capacities does seem objectionable.  This is partly 
because the use of our rational capacities is usually 
our best way of approaching the truth (that’s one 
of the reasons why respecting people’s autonomy 
is so important); but another way in which it’s 
objectionable is that someone who’s ready to use 
non-rational persuasive techniques seems to be 
both arrogant and cowardly, in that he’s unwilling 
to subject his own views to rational critique by 
his hearers.  So there does seem to be some 
reason, based on respect for autonomy, to avoid 
using the term ‘eugenics’ with its strongly emotive 
nature.  This reason doesn’t in any way depend 
on whether practices such as PGD really are 
eugenic, or whether they’re morally objectionable, 
so considerations of autonomy do seem to provide 
us with a neutral reason against using the term 
‘eugenics’.
However it’s also true that there’s another way 
in which emotive language can be used, a way 
in which there’s no undermining of the hearer’s 
autonomy at all.  Many of our beliefs and attitudes 
are so comfortably familiar to us that we never 
really question them at all; we simply take their 
truth for granted.  (Political beliefs are quite often 
like this.)  But sometimes we oughtn’t to take their 
truth for granted, and
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talking about eugenics is so emotive that 
it can bypass people’s rational faculties, in 
something of the same way that gruesome 
images of abortion or perhaps war do. 
Diane Paul, ‘Is Human Genetics Disguised Eugenics?, in 
Michael Ruse and David Hull (eds.) Biology and Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998):536-49.
When emotive language is used for this purpose 
there’s no autonomy-based objection to it – 
encouraging people to think critically about an 
issue doesn’t present any threat to their autonomy. 
On the contrary, it may help them to think freshly 
and independently about the issues at hand.
So the objection to eugenics talk which says that 
that it may threaten people’s autonomy is partially 
successful. It provides us with some reason 
to avoid talk of eugenics, but only where such 
language is a means of circumventing people’s 
critical-rational faculties – that is, their ability to 
reflect and reason for themselves. Eugenics talk is 
often used in this way, but it’s also true that it can 
be used in the opposite way, to arouse and engage 
people’s critical–rational capacities; in these cases 
there’s no failure to respect autonomy, and hence 
no reason to refrain from talking about eugenics.
It should also be noted that ‘eugenics’ is far from 
being the only emotive term in discussions of 
bioethics and so there may be similar reasons to be 
cautious about many other terms.  Indeed, a great 
deal of our communication and language engages 
and affects the emotions to some extent, and acts 
on us through non-rational – or not wholly rational 
– processes.  So the problem with ‘eugenics’ is not 
so much that it is different in kind from other terms 
in bioethics; rather the problem is with the extent 
to which it arouses strong feelings, combined 
with the concerns about ambiguity and confusion 
mentioned earlier.
Conclusions
We’ve seen that ‘eugenics’ can be neutrally defined 
as ‘attempts to improve the human gene pool’, 
and that defining it in this way allows us to discuss 
whether any form of it can be morally acceptable 
(although we haven’t engaged in that substantive 
discussion here). People’s objections to eugenics 
stem in part from the horrors practised by the Nazis 
in their pursuit of eugenic aims, but there’s no 
reason to think that attempts to improve the gene 
pool must necessarily involve the hideous force 
and coercion of the Nazi methods or the racism 
of their aims, nor need we suppose that all such 
attempts must involve the creation of so-called 
‘designer babies’ or lead to human enhancement.
However there’s no doubt that the language of 
eugenics can be highly emotive, and hence is 
very susceptible to confusion and to manipulative 
use: we have good reason to be cautious about 
using strongly emotive language in these debates, 
since its use can easily confuse people and drive 
them to unreasonable or unjustified beliefs.  On 
the other hand we shouldn’t overlook the fact that 
sometimes the use of emotive language can shock 
people into reconsidering what their views really 
are or should be.
We may not be able to resolve these concerns, 
and to decide whether the use of eugenics talk 
is legitimate, until we find satisfactory answers 
to questions about the moral acceptability of our 
selective reproduction practices.  




In the light of this, there’s no overwhelming 
argument for completely abandoning the 
term ‘eugenics’, but concerns remain about 
ambiguity, confusion and manipulation, and 
the consequent failure to respect people’s 
autonomy.  
In the meantime, anyone using ‘eugenics’ in 
policy or philosophical debates must at least 
be clear about what they mean by it and be 
prepared to offer a clear definition.  Otherwise 
unnecessary confusion and disagreement may 
ensue.13
Anon, Interview with Campaigner September 2005
Many of these arguments are discussed in greater detail in 
Stephen Wilkinson, ‘“Eugenics talk” and the language of 
bioethics’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 2008, 34(6), 467-471.
Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s Children: the 
ethics of selective reproduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010): chapter 6.
We use it [‘eugenics’] in the same way 
as we use the word ‘apartheid’ to talk 
about the discrimination that we face 
because that is, from our perspective, 
the reality.  It does shock, and it needs 
to shock people into looking at the 
real situation for disabled people. One 
of the major problems is that we’re 
really not seen as human beings, and 
therefore people’s attitudes to us 
need to be startled…12
emotive language can, in some circumstances, 
be used to shock people into thinking critically 
about matters which they’ve previously left 
unquestioned.  
Selective Reproduction
Stephen Wilkinson and Eve Garrard
Developments in medicine and genetics have 
made it increasingly possible for prospective 
parents to choose not to have a child with a 
disability.  There are various methods for doing 
this, including prenatal genetic testing, and the use 
of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).  In 
PGD, which is our main concern here, embryos are 
created using in vitro fertilisation (IVF), and are then 
examined for the presence of genes likely to cause 
disabilities or diseases.1   
These techniques, and others like them, therefore 
have the potential to prevent a great deal of illness 
and suffering.  And what, one might ask, could 
possibly be wrong with that?
Selective reproduction: methods and 
aims
The answer to that question is complex, and we 
should start by noting that many people have very 
serious reservations about using PGD and other 
methods to ‘select against’ disability or disease in 
future children. Their reservations are sometimes 
about the methods chosen for selecting against 
disability, but often they’re about the goal itself, 
about the very aim of producing fewer children with 
disabilities.  Where people are mainly concerned 
about the means for doing this, their worries can 
often be alleviated by choosing the least morally 
problematic methods – avoiding abortion, say, 
and focussing on PGD (which is not to say that 
the latter is completely uncontroversial); but for 
many people, concerns about these choices would 
remain, even if morally unobjectionable means of 
delivering them could be found.  For these people, 
it’s the goal of selective reproduction itself that is 
morally dubious.3
In the contexts we’re considering here, the aim 
of the selection is to avoid disease or disability: if 
one possible future child would have a disabling, 
excruciating and life-shortening disease, while 
another would not, then choosing to create the 
child who would not have the disease would be 
a case of selective reproduction.4 So what are 
the objections to selective reproduction for the 
purpose of avoiding disease and disability – why 
is it that some people feel that selecting against 
disability is morally very problematic?
Objections to selective reproduction 
(1): eugenics
Firstly let’s look at concerns about eugenics. 
Eugenics is something that many people strongly 
disapprove of; if PGD, and choosing against 
disability generally, turns out to be a form of 
eugenics then it too is likely to fall under that same 
disapproval. So we need to know what eugenics 
is, and what (if anything) is wrong with it, before we 
can understand this eugenics worry.
There are many different definitions of eugenics, 
so we’ll use the most ‘neutral’ one, to avoid 
making any unwarranted assumptions about 
whether it is or isn’t morally wrong.  Eugenics, on 
this straightforward descriptive definition, is the 
attempt to ‘improve the human gene pool’.5 The 
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Selective Reproduction: 
‘Selecting Out’ Disability and Disease
PGD can already be used to ‘select out’ 
over 100 conditions including early onset 
Alzheimer’s disease, BRCA1 (which causes 
increased susceptibility to breast cancer), 
cystic fibrosis, haemophilia, Huntington’s 
Disease (Huntington’s chorea), and sickle cell 
anaemia.2   
What exactly is selective reproduction?  It’s 
the attempt to create one possible future child 
rather than another possible future child.   
For a more detailed account of what PGD involves, see the 
information given on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority website at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/preimplantation-
genetic-diagnosis.html#1
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/hfea/gen/pgd-screening.htm
In the UK, the use of PGD is restricted to cases where there is 
a significant risk of a serious genetic condition being present 
in the embryo.  See the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 




In this paper, for brevity, we’ll use ‘selective reproduction’ to 
refer specifically to cases in which diseases or disabilities 
are ‘selected against’ or ‘screened out’.  The term ‘selective 
reproduction’ can however  be used more widely to refer to 
(for example) choosing to have a child with, rather than a 
child without, a disability, or to choosing your child’s sex – 
both of which are the subjects of other papers in this volume. 
For a fuller discussion of selective reproduction see Stephen 
Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s Children (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010): chapter 1.
Ruth Chadwick, ‘Genetics and Ethics’, in Edward Craig 
(ed.), The Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (London: 
Routledge, 1998).
past been pursued in many different ways, most 
notoriously by the Nazis, who used compulsory 
sterilisation programmes and systematic mass 
murder to eliminate individuals, and whole 
ethnicities, deemed by their ideology to be ‘unfit’. 
For many people, the horrifying Nazi eugenics 
programme has tainted the very idea of eugenics.6 
But attempts to improve the gene pool need not 
be driven by the appalling racist ideologies of the 
Nazis, nor need they take the terrible form of violent 
state coercion.  And there are other ways in which 
people and societies may reasonably pursue aims 
that may ultimately be (at least partly) eugenic. 
These include incest avoidance; providing genetic 
counselling to people with inherited genetic 
disorders; discouraging cousin marriage; or 
encouraging women to have children only in the 
optimum years for doing so (avoiding both teenage 
pregnancy and ‘post-menopausal motherhood’). 
None of these need involve any state coercion or 
violence, and many such practices would be widely 
accepted or even praised. Yet each in its own way 
is an attempt to improve population health, or 
improve the ‘gene pool’, and so could be classed 
as eugenic.7 However some people nonetheless 
object to eugenics of any kind, whatever the means 
used to pursue it, and that’s the kind of objection 
we’ll concentrate on here, leaving to one side 
further discussion of the various possible means of 
achieving eugenic goals.
So assuming that only morally acceptable means 
were used, involving no coercion or violence, what 
might be wrong with eugenic aims – why might 
it be wrong for doctors, or the National Health 
Service, to try to improve the gene pool by, for 
example, giving parents the opportunity to avoid 
the birth of children who, if created, would have 
inherited disabilities and diseases?  One main 
worry is with the very idea of genetic improvement: 
the things that are supposed to improve the gene 
pool, so it is argued, aren’t really improvements 
at all.  If we aimed to increase the number of girls 
with curly blonde hair and blue eyes, or decrease 
the incidence of homosexuality, these wouldn’t 
actually be improvements – the gene pool would 
be no better than it was before the supposedly 
eugenic intervention, just different. So the aim 
of improving the gene pool, the objectors say, is 
mistaken from the start.
Now it’s true that we can be very mistaken about 
what counts as improvement, in genetic matters 
just as in education or housing or sports or politics. 
But it doesn’t follow that there’s no such thing 
as improvement, in any of these fields. Reducing 
the number of people who suffer from debilitating 
diseases, such as those which practices like PGD 
might enable us to avoid, might seem like a real 
improvement in the face of the pain and misery 
such diseases can cause.8  
The avoidance of suffering which such a reduction 
would bring about is a reason for thinking that it 
would be a genuine improvement, not merely a 
change.  And so long as we make it clear what 
reasons there are for thinking that a certain genetic 
intervention would count as an improvement, 
for thinking that it would make things better, 
then there seems to be no reason to rule out the 
possibility of, in this sense, improving the gene 
pool.  Reducing the prevalence of genetic disorders 
through selective reproduction does seem to be 
a genuine improvement, for reasons to do with 
human wellbeing, and hence it fits the definition of 
‘eugenics’ given above.  So it does seem possible 
that we have here, in the non-coercive attempt 
to reduce the prevalence of genetic disease and 
impairment, a genuine case of eugenics which is 
morally defensible, and indeed for those people 
who think that we ought to reduce the amount of 
suffering in the world, it’s an actively good practice 
(even though, as we have seen, other cases of 
eugenic practices may be far less morally innocent.)
Objections to selective reproduction 
(2): the Equal Value Principle
However, even if there are some ethically acceptable 
instances of eugenics, there are other objections 
to selecting out disability that must be considered. 
One of these draws on the Equal Value Principle, 
which says that we ought to value disability and 
non-disability equally.9 
Now it seems that procedures such as PGD, 
which reduce the chances of having a child with a 




See our paper on Eugenics in this volume and Stephen 
Wilkinson, ‘“Eugenics talk” and the language of bioethics’, 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 2008, 34(6), 467-471.
   
There may be other non-eugenic reasons for pursuing such 
policies as well.  For example, one might think that incestuous 
relationships are morally wrong even where there is no chance 
of them resulting in childbirth.
8 As mentioned earlier, the list of possible conditions that 
PGD can already help parents to avoid includes Alzheimer’s 
disease, BRCA1 (which causes increased susceptibility to 
breast cancer), cystic fibrosis, haemophilia, Huntington’s 
disease (Huntington’s chorea), and sickle cell anaemia.
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/hfea/gen/pgd-screening.htm
Eugenics doesn’t seem always to be immoral, 
and so the fact that PGD, and other forms 
of selective reproduction, might sometimes 
technically be eugenic, isn’t sufficient to show 
that they’re wrong.   
disability, do fall foul of this principle, for if people 
really valued disability and non-disability equally, 
why would they try so hard to avoid creating children 
with disabilities?  However as well as asking that 
question, we also have to ask, how convincing is 
the Equal Value Principle itself?  Because if the 
principle isn’t plausible, then the fact that selective 
reproduction goes against it may not matter.
How convincing the Equal Value Principle is 
depends on how exactly we interpret it.  For there 
are two very different possible interpretations. 
First, we can take it to mean exactly what it says, 
that we should attach the very same value to being 
unable to walk or see as we would to being able 
to do those things; similarly, on this interpretation, 
we should value dysfunctional immune systems 
the same as immune systems which can fight 
off infections.  But on this literal interpretation, 
the Equal Value Principle is a mistake. Why 
would anyone believe that an immune system so 
compromised that it leaves a person undefended 
against any opportunistic life-threatening disease is 
as valuable as a healthy functional immune system? 
And wouldn’t (nearly) everyone with good eyesight 
and fully functioning limbs feel that they had lost 
something of great value to them if disease or injury 
took away or diminished either of those things?10 
Furthermore if the Equal Value Principle, when 
interpreted in this way, were correct, we’d have 
no reason to try to cure people who have acquired 
disabilities (for example, through accidents at work 
or on the roads), or to make people pay taxes to 
support a National Health Service which (amongst 
other things) aims to cure people with impairments, 
since we’d value these impairments as highly as 
unimpaired organs or systems. So the fact that 
selective reproduction flouts the Equal Value 
Principle, on this unconvincing interpretation of it, 
doesn’t tell against selective reproduction at all.
However there’s another, much more credible, way 
of interpreting the Equal Value Principle.  On this 
better interpretation, it tells us to value disabled 
people equally to non-disabled ones.  Unlike the 
previous interpretation, this is a very convincing 
moral claim: we should treat people with disabilities 
as having needs and sensitivities and rights which 
are just as important as those of people without 
disabilities.  But on this far more attractive account 
of the Equal Value Principle, the practice of 
selective reproduction doesn’t come into conflict 
with the principle.  The fact that we sometimes try 
to avoid bringing a child with a disability into the 
world says nothing at all about how we should treat 
existing people who already have disabilities; just 
as the fact that we may attempt to cure some of 
them has no implications for how we should treat 
those who can’t be cured. 
Objections to selective reproduction 
(3): harmful consequences
A quite different kind of worry rests on the view 
that success in reducing the incidence of disability 
and disease might have harmful consequences for 
people with disabilities.
Various kinds of harmful consequence flowing 
from selective reproduction are sometimes 
predicted: one is that if the number of people with 
disabilities were significantly reduced, then those 
who remained disabled would experience less 
acceptance and inclusion.  This is because they 
would be more unusual, and consequently treated 
as more ‘alien’ by the non-disabled population. 
Another possible harmful consequence is that 
if there were fewer people with disabilities then 
fewer resources might be allocated to making 
social institutions and the built environment 
accessible and ‘disability-friendly’.  If the number 
of people with disabilities were reduced then those 
remaining would represent a smaller proportion 
of the population, and this fact would alter both 
the economic and the political calculations upon 
which these allocations are often made.  A further 
concern is that if people were able easily to choose 
to avoid the birth of a child with a disability, then the 
parents of those children who do have disabilities 
might (rightly or wrongly) be blamed for failing to 
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9 10 See, for example, the Disability Rights Commission: 
‘Throughout its programme of work on ethical issues, the 
DRC will be guided by two principles: valuing disability and 
non-disability equally, and the right of individuals to make 
informed, autonomous choices.’ DRC Statement on Section 
1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act 1967. (The Disability Rights 
Commission was subsequently replaced by the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission in October 2007.)
There are exceptions to this, such as people with ‘body 
integrity identity disorder’ who often have a desire to 
amputate one or more healthy limbs and/or feel that they 
would be better off living as amputees.
Although there’s nothing morally wrong with 
assigning a negative value to the functional 
limitations which disability often involves, this 
is entirely independent of questions about 
how we should or do value the people who 
have the disability – we should of course value 
them equally to non-disabled people and 
afford them the same treatment and rights.  So 
selective reproduction isn’t in conflict with the 
only form of the Equal Value Principle which is 
at all persuasive.    
avoid their births: for making their children suffer 
and, in some cases, for imposing extra health and 
social care costs on the wider community and the 
taxpayer.
The first of these concerns (about effects on 
attitudes) is hard to assess, since the likelihood of 
increased intolerance towards any group rests on 
so many context-specific considerations that it’s 
difficult to make accurate predictions.  The second 
concern is more convincing, since investment 
in accessible structures and devices does quite 
legitimately rest in part on the number of people 
who will use them.  So this objection does provide 
us with a reason against selective reproduction. 
But that reason would have to be weighed against 
the benefit produced by reducing the prevalence 
of disability: in particular, the reduction in pain 
and functional limitation in the population.  The 
reduction of suffering is a major reason for 
favouring this form of selective reproduction, but 
weighing these different reasons against each 
other is notoriously difficult.  However this problem 
is not unique to this issue; in general it’s hard 
to work out how to distribute resources, or the 
alleviation of suffering, across populations with 
members in very different situations.  For example, 
should we allocate resources to treating childhood 
diseases, or to providing care services for older 
people?  Should we pour money into public 
health schemes to prevent infectious diseases, or 
into fundamental research on how to cure them? 
There is perhaps no general answer about how to 
make these decisions, so we should acknowledge 
that any harm to those who continue to live with 
disability is a reason, though not usually a decisive 
one, against the practice of selective reproduction 
against disability.  One important point to bear 
in mind though is that the extent to which this 
concern tells against selective reproduction will 
depend very much on the numbers involved.  If only 
a handful of parents chose to use PGD to avoid 
a given condition this would make no significant 
difference to the overall numbers of people living 
with that condition.  And in such cases there would 
be little reason to believe that people living with the 
condition would be adversely affected.  Also, we 
should remember that many disabilities are caused 
by environmental factors (e.g. disease and injury) 
or by the effects of ageing and PGD will have no 
direct effect on these.  
Objections to selective reproduction 
(4): the Expressivist Argument
Does selecting against disability really send out 
this message?  And if so, is that always morally 
objectionable (and why)?  We can’t answer these 
questions properly unless we know just what this 
message is supposed to be. Does the message 
say to disabled people that the world would be 
a better place if they were killed?  Or does it say 
to disabled people that the world would have 
been a better place if, rather than conceiving and 
bearing them, their parents had conceived and 
borne healthier children instead?  Or does it say to 
disabled people that the world would have been a 
better place if they hadn’t been born?  These are 
three very different messages, and each one has to 
be considered on its own merits.
Take the first version of the message, that it would 
be better if existing disabled people were killed. 
Is this what selecting against disability, by (for 
example) choosing not to implant embryos with 
genetic disorders, really says to disabled people? 
If it does, then this message is clearly false, 
and morally horrific.  But selective reproduction 
needn’t imply that at all.  People who are already in 
existence have all kinds of needs and rights which 
must be respected by others, and no decision to 
engage in selective reproduction, for any reason 
whatever, entails that existing people should be 
killed.  If we try to discourage teenage pregnancies, 
for example, this really doesn’t entail that we think 
that the children of teenage mothers should be 
killed; similarly if we try to discourage, by PGD or 
other voluntary means, the birth of children with 
disabilities, this really doesn’t entail that we think 
that people with disabilities should be killed.  So that 
can’t be the message that selective reproduction 
sends to existing people with disabilities.
How about the second version then, where the 
message to people with disabilities is thought to 
be that the world would be a better place if their 
parents, instead of conceiving and bearing them, 
had conceived and borne non-disabled children 
instead?  Suppose for a moment that this is 
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Finally, we must consider what’s sometimes 
called the Expressivist Argument - the claim 
that choosing not to conceive or bear a child 
with a disability expresses and sends out a 
very negative message about people with 
disabilities, one that says that it would be 
better if they had not been born.11
See Tom Shakespeare, Disability Rights and Wrongs, (London: 
Routledge, 2006); also Steven Edwards, ‘Disability, Identity, 
and the “Expressivist Objection”’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 
2004, 30(4), 418-420.
indeed the message.  Is it a morally objectionable 
one?  The first thing to note about it is that the 
underlying rationale here is a principle that applies 
to everyone, not one which singles out disability. 
For it’s true of all of us that (other things being 
equal) less functional limitation makes for more 
well-being (and less suffering) in life, and likewise 
it’s true of all of us that (other things being equal) a 
life with less pain is preferable to a life with more. 
So just as one might claim that, given a choice, it 
would be better for parents to choose to create a 
child without rather than with a disability (at least 
for those conditions that cause functional limitation 
and/or pain), one might similarly claim (and on the 
very same grounds) that, for any choice between 
possible future children, we should always choose 
the one within the lowest likely levels of functional 
limitation and pain – even in cases where none of 
the options involves substantial disability.  So, to 
take a purely hypothetical example,
The underlying motivation here is the welfare of the 
child (in this case, an ‘alternative’ child who could 
have been even happier than I have been) and it is 
this fundamental commitment to welfare that gives 
us reason to prefer to minimise functional limitation 
and pain (which generally have bad effects on 
welfare).  Disability only becomes relevant when 
and insofar as it is correlated with significantly 
lower levels of welfare (via its effects on functional 
capacity and pain).
So the world would be a better place (other things 
being equal) if the whole human race were healthier 
and happier. This thought applies to all of us, not 
only to people with disabilities.  But a message 
that applies to everyone doesn’t present a special 
problem for people with disabilities: it doesn’t 
discriminate against them, because it doesn’t 
single them out in any special way.12 So if that’s the 
message of selective reproduction, then it doesn’t 
seem to amount to a strong ‘expressivist’ argument 
against it, since it doesn’t express anything 
distinctively bad or disadvantageous about people 
with disabilities. And nothing follows from this 
message about how all existing people, disabled 
or otherwise, should be treated, especially since 
we all have rights and needs which merely possible 
people don’t have, however happy and healthy 
they would be if they came to exist.
So far, we haven’t found any message being 
given out by selective reproduction that’s both 
genuinely implied by this practice, and also morally 
objectionable.  So now we must consider a third 
possible version of the message, to see if, unlike 
the other two, it does amount to an objection to 
selective reproduction.  In this third version, the 
practice of choosing against disability is thought to 
send a message to people with disabilities saying 
that the world would have been a better place 
if they hadn’t been born.  But as we have seen, 
parents who choose to create a child without, 
rather than a child with, a disability aren’t normally 
saying this.  What they’re saying is that it is better, 
other things being equal, to create children with 
fewer, rather than more, functional limitations.  But 
(again) this is something that could be said of any 
one of us, and hence it sends out no message 
exclusively to people with disabilities. So are there 
any prospective parents, or any practices, which 
might be sending out this third message, that the 
world would have been a better place if children 
with disabilities hadn’t been born?  The only time 
when selective reproduction might imply this is 
when prospective parents choose not to create 
a child at all in preference to creating a child with 
a disability.13 In some circumstances this could 
indeed suggest that the world would be a better 
place without people with disabilities in it.
In fact, even parents who make that choice don’t 
necessarily give out this message – it depends on 
their own reasons for preferring not to have any 
child rather than have a disabled one. 
Selective Reproduction: ‘Selecting Out’ Disability and Disease
14
12
if my mother had been able to select an 
alternative child (instead of me) who was more 
athletic, or cleverer, or more musical, or kinder 
in its nature than I am, or one who was less 
inclined to suffer from moderate back pain, 
then she should have done so.  
Some readers have raised the following objection: perhaps 
it’s true that what we call the ‘fundamental commitment to 
welfare’ ought to apply both to people with and people 
without disabilities.  But in fact it gets applied unequally or 
unfairly only to the ‘selecting out’ of people with disabilities. 
This may well be true and, if it is, this is discriminatory and 
wrong – for it can’t be right for a general principle which 
ought to apply to everyone to be selectively applied only to 
some people.  The unequal application of this principle may
also reveal that people’s motives are not always as defensible 
as they at first sight appear: e.g. perhaps they are motivated 
by a dislike or fear of disability and not, as they claim, just 
welfare considerations.  Our main point however still stands. 
If ‘selecting out’ disability and disease is (genuinely) done 
for welfare reasons then this needn’t send out a morally 
problematic message about existing people with disabilities.
Suppose they decide not to have a disabled 
child just because they feel it would be too 
burdensome for them: they know themselves 
well, perhaps know how readily they get 
tired and irritated, and how much they enjoy 
the wealth and freedom to travel that they 
currently possess; and they think that they 
just wouldn’t want to live the lives of people 
caring for a child with a disability.   In those 
They’re not saying that the world would be better 
without disabled people in it; they’re saying that 
their own lives would be better with no child than 
with a disabled child.  But it can’t be morally wrong 
of them to think or say that, since anyone has the 
moral right not to have children. Of course, they 
may be quite mistaken about what it’s like to look 
after a child with a disability, and about how fulfilling 
their freedom to travel and spend money really is, 
but that’s another matter – people have the right to 
make these mistakes about themselves.
However sometimes people make that decision – 
to have no child rather than have a disabled one – 
for a very different kind of reason. Sometimes they 
make the decision just because they think it would 
be better in general to bring no child into the world 
rather than to create one with a disability.  In that 
case, they really are sending out the message that 
the world would be better if it contained no disabled 
people (or at least no one with the particular 
disability in question).  Their choice is based 
on their views about disability and its negative 
contribution to general welfare, and these views 
do indeed imply that the world would be better 
without children with disabilities in it.  Such views 
are perhaps not very common, and acting on them 
in this way is relatively unusual.  Nonetheless it can 
happen, and in those particular circumstances, the 
practice of selective reproduction does send out 
that troubling message. 
Is the message morally objectionable?  Yes it is, 
since unless the child with a disability has a life 
which is so dreadful, so full of suffering, that it’s 
not worth living (which is rarely the case) then it 
simply won’t be true to say that a world which 
doesn’t contain that child, is better than one which 
does.  Children with disabilities who have lives 
worth living (which is nearly all of them) make the 
world a better place just as non-disabled children 
do, by living lives which have value for themselves 
and others.  The message given out by choosing 
against disability, in cases where the prospective 
parents decide not to have any child rather than 
to have a disabled one, and where they make this 
decision on the grounds of general welfare, is 
indeed morally objectionable, firstly because the 
message is false, and secondly because it devalues 
something which is of great value, the worthwhile 
lives of disabled people.
So there is some reason to avoid or condemn 
selective reproduction in those cases. 
Conclusions
Selective reproduction (such as PGD) when 
used as a means of ‘selecting against’ disease 
and disability, has the potential to prevent the 
occurrence of considerable amounts of suffering 
– both for children and parents.  However, it also 
raises a number of ethical concerns. 
This paper has, we hope, revealed that some of 
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To this extent the Expressivist Argument does 
have some force: in a very restricted number 
of cases of selective reproduction, a message 
which is both objectionable and false is sent 
to (and about) people with disabilities.14    
Avoiding the birth of a child with a disability through 
abortion may therefore be rather more vulnerable to this 
Expressivist Argument than PGD (because the latter 
more often and more straightforwardly involves ‘same 
number’ choices).  This issue is however complex.  See 
the following for further discussion: Sally Sheldon and 
Stephen Wilkinson, ‘Termination of Pregnancy for reason of 
foetal disability: Are there grounds for a special exception 
in Law? ‘, Medical Law Review, 2001, 9(2), 85-109.
For a more detailed discussion of the Expressivist Argument, 
see Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s Children 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), chapter 6.
14
In particular, there are fears:
(1)  
(2)   
(3)  
(4)   
that these attempts to ‘select out’ disease 
and disability are eugenic;
that they are inconsistent with valuing 
people with and without disabilities 
equally;
that they could harm existing people with 
disabilities; and
that they send out a negative message to 
and about existing people with disabilities.
The argument that selective reproduction 
is eugenics seems not, on its own, to be a 
particularly strong objection.  This is partly 
because, depending on the intentions of 
the people involved and on the means used, 
arguably not all cases of selective reproduction 
are eugenic (for example, it may not be 
eugenics when the aim is not to ‘improve 
the gene pool’).  But even where selective 
circumstances the message they send out is 
mainly about themselves and about what kind 
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There don’t therefore seem to be any 
knockdown arguments that would tell against 
all forms of selection via PGD.  However, 
some of these arguments may be successful 
against some particular forms of selection 
in some particular contexts: for example, 
where prospective parents (or doctors or 
policymakers) are motivated by unjustifiably 
negative attitudes towards disability.
reproduction is eugenic (which it sometimes is)
it does not follow automatically from this that 
it’s wrong (despite the fact that many instances 
of eugenics historically have been morally 
abhorrent).  For provided that the means used 
are ethically acceptable, and that people
freely consent, it’s not clear that attempting to 
improve population health (‘the gene pool’) is a 
bad thing for us to be doing.  On the contrary, 
it seems on the face of it to be a good thing 
– given the high value that most of us place 
on good health, and on preventing ourselves 
and our loved ones from acquiring diseases or 
impairments.
Selective reproduction needn’t imply that 
people with and people without disabilities 
aren’t valued equally.  This is because of 
the important distinction between attaching 
negative value to impairment and pain (which 
do seem to be bad things) and attaching 
negative value to people with impairment and 
pain.  Doing the first of these needn’t and 
shouldn’t imply the second 
As for the suggestion that selective reproduction 
could harm existing people with disabilities 
we found that there is probably some truth in 
this.  For example, if there were fewer people 
with disabilities then fewer resources might be 
allocated to making social institutions and the 
built environment accessible and ‘disability-
friendly’.  These dangers are real but need to 
be weighed against the benefits of selective 
reproduction and, in particular, the reduction in 
the amount of functional limitation and pain that 
might ensue if the prevalence of impairments 
and painful conditions in the population could 
be reduced.
Finally, we considered the Expressivist 
Argument, which says that what’s wrong with 
selective reproduction is that it sends out 
an unacceptably negative message about 
people with disabilities.  We concluded that 
this argument does work successfully against 
a particular narrow range of cases – those in 
which both (a) the prospective parents would 
rather have no child at all than a child with a 
disability and (b) their reason for that preference 
is the belief that the world would be better if it 
contained no disabled people (or at least no 
one with the particular disability in question). 
But most cases of selective reproduction are 
not like this.  More often, people are motivated 
by fears about not being able to cope, or about 
(in one sense, ‘selfish’) desires not to have to 
provide lifelong care for a child with a serious 
illness, or (perhaps most commonly of all in the 
case of PGD) by a preference for a child with 
less functional limitation and pain rather than 
more functional limitation and pain.
Choosing Disability
Stephen Wilkinson and Eve Garrard
In 2002, an American lesbian couple, Sharon 
Duchesneau and Candy McCullough, both of 
whom were deaf, deliberately chose to have a 
deaf baby.1 They attracted fierce criticism.2 So did 
Tomato Lichy and his partner Paula Garfield in the 
UK in 2008 when they publicly expressed their 
desire to do something similar via IVF.3  Duchesneau 
and McCullough didn’t have to use any advanced 
biomedical techniques to ensure that they had a 
deaf child; they had as a sperm donor a friend with 
five generations of deafness in his family.  But there 
are now embryo selection techniques which could 
(in principle) be used by parents wanting to create a 
child with a disability.  UK law specifically prohibits 
the selection of an embryo with a genetic disability 
or disease in preference to a ‘healthy’ one.4 In what 
follows, we’re going to explore whether this ban is 
justified, and also whether parents who prefer and 
seek to create a child with a disability are doing 
anything morally wrong.
Harm to the child (Part I) - existence vs . 
non-existence
Why, we might ask, would anyone want to do this? 
What reasons could parents have for choosing to 
have a child with a disability, in the face of one very 
obvious objection: that this choice harms the child?
There is an answer to this question. Certainly it 
would be profoundly wrong deliberately to mutilate 
a healthy child, or to make it deaf, and that’s 
because it would harm the child, make that child 
worse off.  But where it’s a matter of choosing which 
embryo to implant, which embryo will develop into 
a child, there’s a difficulty in saying that implanting 
an embryo which will eventually become a child 
with a disability actually harms that self-same 
child.  Why?  Because the only alternative to 
implanting that embryo – the embryo which will 
become Baby Alice, let’s say, who will be deaf – is 
not to implant that embryo, and to choose another 
embryo instead.  But if a different embryo were 
implanted instead of the one that would become 
Baby Alice, then the child that it develops into may 
not be deaf, that’s true; but neither will it be Baby 
Alice at all.  It will be another, different, child – Baby 
Barbara, let’s say.
There are only two alternatives for the embryo which 
could become Baby Alice: either it’s implanted, or it 
isn’t.  If it’s implanted, then (if all goes to plan) it will 
grow into Baby Alice, who will be deaf; her genetic 
makeup will cause that to happen.  Alternatively if 
it isn’t implanted, Baby Alice will never come into 
existence – instead another, different, embryo will 
get implanted, which will grow into Baby Barbara, 
who won’t be deaf.  There is no way in which Baby 
Alice can come into existence without being deaf, 
since that’s what her genetic makeup guarantees. 
This is quite unlike the case of a hearing child who 
has been deafened: he could perfectly well have 
continued to live as a hearing child, and so he is 
truly harmed – made worse off – by the choice to 
make him deaf.  But Baby Alice, if she gets born, 
won’t have been harmed by being implanted, since 
it won’t have made her worse off.  For the only 
alternative for her is, in effect, never to have been 
born.  So when the choice is between deafness 
and non-existence, we can’t say that the deaf child 
has been harmed by being chosen for existence: 
she hasn’t been harmed because she hasn’t been 
made worse off.  And that’s because existence as 
a deaf child isn’t usually worse than never having 








It would surely be utterly abhorrent to 
deliberately deafen a hearing child, or to cut 
off the hands or legs of a healthy child, so 
how can it be right to deliberately implant an 
embryo knowing that it will develop into a child 
with a disability, and wanting it to do so?
David Teather, ‘Lesbian Couple Have Deaf 
Baby by Choice’, The Guardian, 8th April 2002.
See Jeanette Winterson, ‘How would we feel if blind women 
claimed the right to a blind baby?’, The Guardian, 9th April 2002.
See Clare Murphy, ‘Is it wrong to select a deaf 
embryo’?, BBC News, Monday 10th March 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/7287508.stm
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (Part 1, 
s.14, 4.9) introduced a prohibition on deliberately ‘selecting in’ 
disease or disorder.  Specifically, what it says is that: “Persons 
or embryos that are known to have a gene, chromosome or 
mitochondrion abnormality involving a significant risk that 
a person with the abnormality will have or develop— (a) a 
serious physical or mental disability, (b) a serious illness, or 
(c) any other serious medical condition, must not be preferred 
to those that are not known to have such an abnormality.”
Given this wording, while the HFE Act forbids ‘selecting in’ 
disease or disorder in cases of choosing between affected 
and unaffected embryos, there seems to be no parallel 
restriction where no unaffected viable embryo is available 
for implantation. Thus, people with genetic-based disabilities 
could perhaps lawfully use IVF and embryo testing to help 
them deliberately create a child with their disability, but only 
in the absence of unaffected viable embryos.
But if a different child who had been deliberately 
deafened during its lifetime – Baby Andrew, let’s 
say – were to ask his parents why they allowed this 
to happen, no such answer could be given.  For 
whereas Andrew could perfectly well have existed 
(and continued to exist) as a hearing person, Alice 
could not.  So it doesn’t seem as if preferring to 
create a child with a disability to one without, 
and then using IVF and embryo selection to bring 
about that preference, would actually harm the 
child created.  The reason for this is that (as in the 
case of Alice) the only alternative to being selected 
(for the child in question) is of course not being 
selected and hence never being born – and in very 
few cases of disability, if any, are the effects so bad 
that not existing would be preferable.5
Harm to the child (Part II) - is deafness 
really a disability?
Other attempts have been made to fend off the 
claim that selecting for disability harms the child.
Indeed, some people claim that deafness is entirely 
socially constructed – that it has no intrinsically 
negative features in itself, with any disadvantage 
stemming from social attitudes and discriminatory 
practices.  They compare deafness with being 
black in a predominantly white country.  In such 
countries, black people are less well off than whites, 
but this is purely a matter of social discrimination: 
no-one (except the most extreme racists) would 
think that being black is in itself an impairment, nor 
would anyone object to a black couple preferring to 
have a black child.  Duchesneau and McCullough, 
for example, state:
Therefore, so the argument goes, people shouldn’t 
object to, or try to prevent, parents who are 
members of the Deaf community7  choosing to have 
a child just like them, one who can participate fully 
in the rich culture which Deaf people have created. 
Thinking along these lines, the idea of ‘audism’ has 
been developed by some Deaf people, to express 
the view that a preference for hearing/speaking 
people is a form of discrimination, structurally 
comparable to racism or sexism.
Lichy and Garfield, whose case we mentioned 
earlier, argue that if the State or doctors insist that 
embryos which carry ‘deafness genes’ must be 
discarded in favour of unaffected embryos, then 
this discriminates against deaf parents, who only 
want the same amount of choice as hearing parents 
– that is, to have a child like themselves.  They 
have also suggested that insisting on choosing the 
non-deaf child over the deaf one is actually a form 
of eugenics.8 On standard accounts of eugenics, 
which define ‘eugenics’ as attempts to improve the 
human gene pool, this may well be correct and, 
what’s more, if this policy is forced upon unwilling 
members of the Deaf community by either law or 
health professionals then it looks like authoritarian 
eugenics.  However, as noted elsewhere, this may 
not settle the ethical issues and we would need 
further argument to show that all cases of eugenics 
are wrong.9   
In some circumstances, aspects of this argument 
may be legitimate. Deafness does involve a 
physical limitation, an inability to hear; but that 
will only amount to an actual disability if it reduces 
the person’s capacity to flourish, to have a high 
level of wellbeing. The disadvantages of being 
unable to hear won’t reduce the individual’s 






Some people have argued that deafness, for 
example, isn’t a disability at all: deaf people 
have a perfectly good language of their own 
(Sign language) and a rich and satisfying 
culture of which that language is a part.  
If Baby Alice says to her parents: ‘Why did 
you allow me to be born deaf?’ their answer 
might be: ‘That was the only way you could 
have been born at all.  We couldn’t have had 
you without the deafness; the only alternative 
was to have a totally different child altogether’.
Our view ... is that being deaf is a 
positive thing, with many wonderful 
aspects. We don’t view being deaf 
along the same lines as being 
blind or mentally retarded; we see 
it as paralleling being Jewish or 
black. We don’t see members of 




Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s Children (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010): 4-7.
See Dominic Lawson, ‘Of course a deaf couple want a deaf 
child’, The Independent, 11th March 2008. 
Members of the Deaf community are ‘people with audiological 
deafness who use sign language as their major means of 
communication and who identify as a sociolinguistic group 
with their own distinctive culture’. Jackie Leach Scully, 
‘“Choosing Disability”, Symbolic Law, and the Media’, 
Medical Law International, 2011, 11(3), 197-212: 197.
See: BBC interview with Tomato Lichy and Paula Garfield, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O7aFE9kPD14  
See our discussion of eugenics earlier in this volume.
by the social and cultural advantages of being 
a member of the Deaf community.  But in other 
circumstances a deaf child may not be extensively 
exposed to Deaf culture, and with nothing to 
outweigh the physical limitation of deafness she 
may truly be disabled by her inability to hear. 
Furthermore, a person needn’t be deaf in order to 
participate in Deaf culture: many people learn two 
languages and can move smoothly from one to the 
other; so a hearing child of Deaf parents may be 
able to learn Sign, and participate in Deaf culture, 
without herself being deaf.  So Deaf parents needn’t 
always necessarily have a deaf child in order to 
have a child who shares their language and culture.
What we can infer from all this, specifically thinking 
for now about the case of deafness which gets 
discussed the most, is that
Is all disability ‘socially constructed’?
Some people want to go further and argue that all 
disability (not just deafness) is primarily a matter 
of social discrimination, and that if society were 
to treat people fairly then what we would have is 
not disability but merely impairment.  For example, 
UPIAS states:
But is this view a plausible one? 
For something to count as a disability at all 
(rather than mere difference) it must involve some 
limitation or incapacity which, potentially at least, 
reduces the individual’s flourishing, even though 
this potential isn’t always realised. Of course 
social discrimination such as mockery or assault, 
or the refusal to alter the built environment to 
enable people with disabilities to make use of 
it more easily, can greatly add to disadvantage. 
However, although social arrangements can make 
an enormous difference to how much the physical 
limitation actually affects a person’s welfare, some 
impairments at least are independent of social 
arrangements: even on a desert island where there 
are no social pressures at all, someone who’s had 
a stroke (for example) will still be limited by its 
effects.
So this argument in defence of selection for 
disability doesn’t seem to be very successful, 
but the principal argument against choosing 
disability – the claim that it harms the child – is 
also problematic.  In order to understand more 
fully why, we need to look closely at the concept 
of harm itself.
Harm to the child (Part III) - what is 
harm?
What does it take to harm someone, to make them 
worse off?  One way in which a person can be 
harmed is by being made worse off than she was 
before.  If someone accidentally runs over your 
bicycle, leaving it a total write-off, they’ve harmed 
you, because they’ve made you worse off than you 
were before the accident – you no longer have a 
bike to ride.  If someone assaults you, beating you 
so badly that your eyesight is damaged for life, 
they’ve harmed you, because you’re worse off than 
you were before.  Prior to the attack you could see; 
now you can’t.
But being made worse off than they were before 
isn’t the only way in which people can be harmed: 
they can also be harmed by being made worse 
off than they would otherwise have been. If you’re 
waiting for some money, which you really need, to 
be sent to you, but it doesn’t arrive because the 




the effects of deafness on the welfare of the 
child created are likely to vary considerably 
from case to case and from context to context. 
Certainly, it seems plausible to suppose 
that in some cases its effects are neutral or 
even positive (bearing in mind the social and 
cultural effects mentioned above). But there 
will be others in which its effects are negative, 
all things considered.
If we ask whether the disadvantage 
associated with disability is the result of social 
In our view it is society which disables 
physically impaired people. Disability 
is something imposed on top of 
our impairments by the way we are 
unnecessarily isolated and excluded 
from full participation in society. 
Disabled people are therefore an 
oppressed group in society.10
discrimination, or whether it stems from the 
nature of the disability itself, surely the answer 
is that it’s “a bit of both”.11   
UPIAS (Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation), 
quoted in Michael Oliver, Understanding Disability: from 
theory to practice, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1996): 33.
Richard Hull, ‘Cheap Listening?  Reflections on the concept 
of wrongful disability’, Bioethics, 2006, 20(2), 55-63: 56.
Jonathan Glover, Choosing Children: genes, disability, and 
design (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006): 7-8.
indeed harm you, even though it doesn’t make 
you any worse off than you were before.  What it 
does do is make you worse off than you would 
otherwise have been, if the sender had put the 
money in the post on time. That’s another way of 
harming people, by making them worse off than 
they would otherwise have been.  Suppose you 
win a million pounds on the lottery, but before you 
even hear about it another person steals your ticket 
and claims the money.  He hasn’t made you worse 
off than you were before, since you didn’t have a 
million pounds before the theft and you certainly 
don’t have it now; but he’s harmed you, because 
he’s made you worse off than you’d otherwise have 
been, if the theft hadn’t taken place.
Has a child deliberately created or selected for its 
disability been harmed in either of these ways? 
Has she been made worse off than she was 
before? Has she been made worse off than she 
would otherwise have been?
She certainly doesn’t seem to have been made 
worse off than she was before, since she didn’t 
exist at all before the decision to implant the 
embryo which she eventually developed out of.  So 
she hasn’t been harmed in that way, at any rate. 
To decide whether she’s been made worse off 
than she would otherwise have been, we have to 
consider what the ‘otherwise’ amounts to – what 
the alternative to implantation would have been 
for the child who developed from that embryo. 
And the alternative is clear: if that embryo hadn’t 
been implanted, that child would never have come 
into existence. Another embryo would have been 
chosen instead for implantation, developing into 
a different child; the child who was selected for 
disability wouldn’t have existed at all.  So she 
hasn’t been harmed in that way, either – we can’t 
say that she’s been made worse off than she 
would otherwise have been.  Either way, the child 
selected for disability doesn’t seem to have been 
harmed by it.
There is however one further argument focussing 
on harm to the selected child, that has sometimes 
been made against selecting for disability.  What 
happens if we consider the complete life-span of 
disabled individuals – if we look across their whole 
lifetime?  Surely then we can understand that they 
have indeed been harmed: we can just see how 
being disabled has made them worse off when 
we look at all the negative experiences they have 
which stem from their disability (either directly or 
because of social discrimination, which - wrong 
though it may be – is a fact of life). The child who 
has to use a wheelchair all her life, due perhaps to 
spinal abnormalities, will not be able to join in her 
non-disabled peers’ physical activities, and may 
suffer considerably more pain than a child who has 
no disability, for example from pressure ulcers, or 
urinary tract infections. These are indeed genuinely 
negative experiences.  But forceful though this 
argument may seem it still won’t do the work we 
want it to: it won’t show that the selected child 
has been harmed by being selected for disability. 
The argument focuses on the fact that people with 
disabilities undergo many negative experiences, 
and nobody would want to deny that; however it 
overlooks the fact that all lives contain negative 
experiences, and most of the time this certainly 
doesn’t make the life in question not worth living.12 
Negative experiences aren’t usually enough to 
justify saying that the person who undergoes 
them has been harmed by being brought into 
existence – some far more radical argument would 
be needed to show any such thing. Most disabled 
people have lives which contain many positive 
experiences as well as many negative ones, and 
they’re emphatically well worth living.
Whatever (if anything) is wrong with selecting for 
disability, it doesn’t seem to be that it harms the 
selected child, whose only chance of existence is 
to be born with a disability.
A different argument about harm: 
general levels of wellbeing
However there is another, quite different, kind of 
argument about quality of life which may carry 
more weight against selecting for disability.  This is 
a much more impersonal argument than the ones 
we’ve looked at so far, which have all been about 
harm specifically to the child created.  This new 
argument isn’t directly about harm to that child, but 
about the overall amounts of wellbeing in a society. 
Here we might generally feel that we should try 
to increase the overall amount of wellbeing in the 
world, where we can. Selecting for disability seems 
to involve bringing into existence people who will 
have more suffering and less happiness in their 




Our closer look at the idea of harm simply 
doesn’t show that children selected for 
disability have been harmed thereby.  This is 
perhaps an unexpected and counter-intuitive 
result. Many people who object to selecting 
for disability feel quite strongly that it involves 
some harm to the child concerned; but it just 
doesn’t seem possible to show that this is 
really what’s happening.   
Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s Children (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010): 84.
If we bring Baby Sandra, who will spend her life 
in a wheelchair, into the world, the chances are 
that she’ll have more suffering in her life than Baby 
Thomas, who won’t have a disability.  As we have 
seen, this doesn’t mean that Baby Sandra would 
be harmed by being selected.  But it does mean 
that choosing Baby Sandra entails choosing to 
have a lower overall level of wellbeing in the world 
than choosing Baby Thomas.  
This is a welfare argument, though it’s a very 
impersonal one, since it doesn’t make the claim that 
there are any individuals who would be harmed by 
selecting for disability – a claim which, as we have 
seen, can’t be justified.  All this argument claims 
is that more wellbeing in the world is better than 
less wellbeing; and when we can choose, that’s 
what we should aim for. Hence, on this view, we 
shouldn’t select for disability.14
This argument sounds quite convincing, until we 
look at it a little more closely.  For a start, is it really 
true that selecting for disability involves selecting 
for lower rather than higher quality of life?  If the 
implication is that all disabled people have a 
lower quality of life than any non-disabled person, 
then that’s clearly untrue. When we looked at the 
triumphant faces of some of the great paralympian 
athletes who had just won medals in London 2012, 
for example, we weren’t looking at people who 
were living thin impoverished lives. Some disabled 
people lead fuller, richer and happier lives than 
some non-disabled people. So being disabled 
clearly doesn’t inevitably mean having a lower 
quality of life.
Perhaps the argument means that on average, 
disabled people have worse lives than non-disabled 
people?  There are reasons why there may be some 
truth in this: the very idea of disability contains 
an implication of reduced capacity to flourish, 
since a feature of a person won’t even count as 
a disability unless it in some way undermines a 
person’s capacity to have a high quality of life.15 
But this in no way rules out the possibility that 
there are individual cases in which the disabled 
person, or her circumstances, can overcome her 
disadvantages and have a flourishing and highly 
worthwhile life; and in fact there are many such 
cases (some of the most famous examples include 
the profoundly deaf Beethoven, who gave humanity 
such incomparable music; the blind poet Homer; 
the paralysed physicist Stephen Hawking, and 
countless other less dramatic but no less genuine 
cases of lives containing both disability and high 
levels of wellbeing).  Furthermore, the extent to 
which a person’s quality of life is reduced by her 
disability may depend to some degree on her own 
preferences (being colour-blind may not reduce 
a person’s quality of life at all if she doesn’t want 
to take up activities which rely on precise colour 
identification), or by the extent to which her social 
and physical environment does or does not include 
helpful and supportive arrangements, such as the 
general provision of ramps and automatic doors to 
help people who use wheelchairs.
 
So even this more impersonal objection to selecting 
for disability based on overall levels of wellbeing will 
only apply to some cases of choosing for disability. 
And furthermore, there is a serious problem with 
the impersonal welfare argument: it may have an 
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But, so this argument goes, we should surely 
choose, where we can, to bring into existence 
more wellbeing rather than less; higher quality 
of life rather than lower.13   
So people who are disabled don’t always 
have lower levels of welfare than those who 
are not disabled, and in those cases where 
individuals do have a poorer quality of life 
on account of their disability, much of this 
differential can be reduced by appropriate 
physical and social arrangements (such as 
the provision of Sign interpreters for films and 
television programmes, or Braille versions of 
documents, or wheelchair-accessible toilets). 
The underlying idea here is what Derek Parfit calls the Same 
Number Quality Claim.  According to this principle, for same-
number choices (choices between creating Population 
A and Population B, where A and B are the same size), it 
would be worse (and therefore wrong) to choose to create 
B if choosing A would result in higher quality of life overall. 
Crucially, this would be the case (according to the Same 
Number Quality Claim) even if choosing B did not harm any 
individual (e.g. in cases where A and B have no members in 
common).  Individual reproductive decisions may be thought 
of as choices between different ‘populations’, each with one 
member, for these purposes.  See: Derek Parfit, Reasons 
and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984): 360.
It is important to mention (or reiterate) two important 
qualifications here.  First, if it could be shown that, in certain 
15 
circumstances (e.g. some cases of deafness), selecting 
in favour of disability was unlikely to have any deleterious 
effects on quality of life, then even this impersonal 
argument would not apply.  Second, disability (and even 
health generally) are not the only potential targets of these 
‘impersonal’ arguments and they could, for example, be 
used to defend funding fertility treatment selectively only 
for the prospective parents who are most able to provide 
an environment conducive to high child welfare (perhaps 
those that have better parenting skills or more money).
  
Jonathan Glover, Choosing Children: genes, disability, and 
design (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006): 9.
 
Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s Children (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010): 57-67.
implication that many people find morally very 
objectionable.
Higher welfare and ‘designer babies’
If we really think that having more wellbeing in the 
world is better than having less; and that when we 
can choose, that’s what we should aim for, then 
it seems that we must accept that when we can 
choose to create children with higher abilities and 
capacities, then that’s what we should do.  If we 
ought always to select in favour of higher quality 
of life, it seems as if we ought always to choose 
the embryos with the greatest chance of a high 
quality of life.  And if we discover how to enhance 
these chances, so much the better, according to 
this argument.  So if a woman is choosing between 
several embryos, most of which are ‘average’, but 
one of which is much ‘better than average’, such 
that it will develop into a person with exceptional 
sporting or intellectual abilities, or perhaps with 
an exceptionally effective immune system – all 
features which might be thought to improve a 
person’s chances of having a high quality of life 
– then that’s what the woman ought to choose. 16 
It would, according to this argument, simply be 
wrong to choose to implant a normal rather than an 
exceptional embryo whose chances of high welfare 
levels are much better than average; and if we can 
learn how to enhance embryos to make more of 
them exceptional in this way, then we should go 
right ahead and do it.
But there are considerable problems with this 
view.  Even where the enhancement is relatively 
minor and cosmetic, such as the choice of hair or 
eye colour, some people are concerned about the 
possibility of, as it’s sometimes put, sliding down 
a slippery slope to alarming brave new worlds in 
which ‘designer babies’ will be created, disability 
will be stigmatised, and the normal and the natural 
are devalued and disrespected:
Many people would find this prospect a morally 
obnoxious one – normal is quite good enough, they 
say, and the idea that we might coerce parents into 
having the ‘best possible’ child in all cases is really 
abhorrent.  But this is indeed an implication of the 
impersonal welfare argument: it says we ought 
always to choose to produce higher welfare rather 
than lower welfare, where we can; and if that rules 
out choosing in favour of disability, it may also 
rule in choosing in favour of enhancement.  The 
argument in both cases is the same: we ought 
always to choose to produce higher welfare rather 
than lower welfare, where we can.
Embryo enhancement is morally very contentious, 
to say the least.  If we want to preserve a blanket 
prohibition on selecting for disability we need 
to look for an argument or principle capable of 
justifying the view that selecting for disability is 
especially morally bad, so bad that it should be 
prohibited, without requiring us to support embryo 
enhancement to produce extraordinarily gifted 
children – something which many people would 
find morally repugnant. Arguments to do with 
wellbeing, either that of the specific child selected 
for disability, or more impersonal considerations to 
do with overall levels of welfare, have not so far 
provided us with what we want.  So far, unless 
we’re prepared to endorse embryo enhancement, 







The concern is that we’ll be 
creating a society with new sorts 
of discrimination. Now it’s hair 
and eye colour. What happens if 
it’s height and intelligence? Some 
parents may have qualms, but still 
feel under pressure.17
It should be noted that these are hypothetical examples, not 
choices that are presently available.
Marcy Darnovsky (Director of the Centre for Genetics and 
Society), quoted in Philip Sherwell, ‘LA delivers first designer-
baby clinic’, The Age, 3rd March 2009.
http: / /www.theage.com.au/wor ld/ la-del ivers-f i rst-
designerbaby-clinic-20090302-8meq.html 
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Some people have questioned whether wishing to avoid 
creating people with disabilities, for impersonal welfare 
reasons, really does commit one logically to the maximisation 
of welfare, or to human enhancement. Some such arguments 
are discussed in Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing Tomorrow’s 
Children (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): chapter 3. 
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Further reasons against banning 
selecting for disability
Furthermore, we need also to consider whether 
there are good reasons for not outlawing selecting
for disability; whether, that is, there’s any serious 
moral objection to preventing parents from 
choosing to have, say, a child who is deaf like 
themselves.  One obvious general reason is that 
Another reason against having laws banning 
selecting for disability is the possible effect of the 
mere existence of such laws on people who already 
have disabilities, and on the attitudes towards 
disability of the whole population.
Laws against hate speech are like this: even where 
they aren’t strictly enforced, they communicate 
a message to everyone about what kind of 
behaviour towards members of our diverse society 
is to be considered thoroughly undesirable and 
unacceptable.  Similarly, prohibiting by law the 
selection of an embryo because it will develop 
into a deaf child may send out the message that 
deafness is a seriously undesirable condition which 
leads to so intolerably low a quality of life that it’s 
morally wrong to prefer to have a deaf child rather 
than a hearing one.  But many Deaf people would 
deny this, and would regard the symbolic force of 
the law in expressing this message about deafness 
as itself harmful to Deaf people.19
Admittedly deafness may be a special case, since 
it’s possible to argue that it isn’t a disability (or isn’t 
harmful) in some circumstances.  If that’s right, 
then perhaps we don’t have a strong argument 
for preventing parents from selecting in favour 
of deafness. Another such condition may be 
achondroplasia (a type of dwarfism), where again 
it may be argued that this needn’t always be a 
disability, and that parents should be able to choose 
to have a baby like themselves if they so wish.20 
But there are many other conditions that can be 
detected using PGD and which could therefore (if 
the law allowed it) be positively selected for, and 
a lot of these clearly are disabilities or disorders. 
The list includes early onset Alzheimer’s disease, 
BRCA1 (which causes increased susceptibility 
to breast cancer), cystic fibrosis, haemophilia, 
Huntington’s disease (Huntington’s chorea), 
and sickle cell anaemia.21 Why are these things 
(arguably unlike some cases of deafness or 
achondroplasia) clearly disabilities or disorders? 
Because of their likely negative effects on quality 
of life, on health, and on length of life.  People with 
these conditions generally have lives very well 
worth living, of course.  So we can’t argue that they 
have been harmed by being created.  So if we feel, 
as many do, that we should not allow parents to 
select for these disabilities in future children (and 
if the reason is to do with levels of wellbeing) then 
it looks as if the impersonal welfare argument is 
doing the work.  This says that we should choose 
to bring about higher levels of wellbeing rather than 
lower ones, where we can.  But we’ve seen that 
it doesn’t apply at all convincingly to some cases 
of disability, and especially not to characteristics 
such as deafness.  
Conclusions
Many people’s first reaction is that seeking 
deliberately to create a child with a disability is 
morally repugnant and obviously wrong. This 
reaction is more often than not driven by a very 
proper concern with the welfare of the child 
created, the thought being that ‘choosing disability’ 
through embryo selection is akin to injuring an 
existing child. As we have seen however this view, 
on deeper reflection, is hard to maintain, for two 
key reasons.
Firstly and most fundamentally this is because 
normally the only alternative for the child would be 
non-existence and so (except perhaps in a small 
number of cases involving intolerable suffering) it 
is hard to maintain that the child has been harmed 
by being created.  Most people with disabilities 
are glad to be alive and would prefer to exist than 
never to have been born.  So, in the light of this, it 
seems perverse to attempt to prevent such people 
from existing in the future for their own good, or in 




we should be reluctant to stop people from 
doing what they want to do if it doesn’t cause 
significant harm – and as we have seen, it’s 
very hard to show that selecting for disability 
actually harms the children involved.  
Law, whether or not it is fully enforced, 
sometimes has a powerful symbolic effect: 
it sends out a message to the members of 
a society about what the moral norms and 
values of that society are, or are hoped to be.  
20
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For a much fuller treatment of this issue see: Jackie Leach 
Scully, ‘“Choosing Disability”, Symbolic Law, and the Media’, 
Medical Law International, 2011, 11(3), 197-212.
See Darshak Sanghavi, ‘Wanting Babies Like Themselves, 
Some Parents Choose Genetic Defects’, The New York 
Times, 5th December 2006.
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/hfea/gen/pgd-screening.htm.
Secondly, there are some disabilities (including 
arguably some cases of deafness) which do not 
always have a significant adverse effect on overall 
quality of life; indeed, it has been argued that some 
members of the Deaf community are better off 
deaf.  Hence, again, the harm-based rationale for 
preventing such people from existing in the future 
seems flawed.
Having said that, parents do have some reason 
morally to create children with more rather than 
less wellbeing, which is hardly surprising given the 
importance we attach to raising children in ways 
that will enable them to flourish.  And this may 
sometimes (though by no means always) be a 
good reason to prefer to create a child without to a 
child with a disability – depending of course on the 
nature of the disability and the circumstances into 
which the child will be born.
And this lack of justification is amplified by concerns 
over the symbolic harm caused by enshrining such 
a restriction in legislation, about what this might 
seem to say about people with disabilities.  The 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as 
amended) in any case places on clinicians a general 
obligation to take account of “the welfare of any 
child who may be born as a result of the treatment 
(including the need of that child for supportive 
parenting), and of any other child who may be 
affected by the birth”.23 This may be sufficient 
to filter out the most extreme cases of selecting 
for disability (if indeed there are any such cases) 
including those in which the child’s life would be so 
awful that it would be ‘harmed by being created’.
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As regards the question of whether the law 
should prevent prospective parents from 
‘choosing disability’, it seems that – given the 
absence of harm to the child in most cases – a 
specific ban on this, such as has existed in the 
UK since 2008, is unjustified.  
Consider, for example, the following comment by Ed Smith 
(who has himself been has been quadriplegic since 1998): 
“I know several people with quadriplegia who swear up and 
down that they are really happy. Some of them have even said 
they’re glad they had the accident because it changed their 
lives for the better. A friend who is also quadriplegic assured 
me not long ago that he didn’t have a complaint in the world.” 
‘Death, Not Disability is the End of the World’, Sunday 6th 
December 2009, http:// asonginthisworld.blogspot.
co.uk/2009/12/death-not-disability-is-end-of-world.html.
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high quality of life against all odds’, Social Science  
& Medicine, 1999, 48(8): 977-88.
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as 
amended) s.13(5) states: “A woman shall not be provided 
with treatment services unless account has been taken of 
the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the 
treatment (including the need of that child for supportive 









Stephen Wilkinson and Eve Garrard
Methods Old and New
Choosing – or at least trying to choose – the sex 
of your baby is nothing new; people have tried 
many different things in various times and places 
in an attempt to affect the sex of their future baby. 
Eating more bananas, using alkaline douches, 
conceiving close to ovulation, increasing the intake 
of breakfast cereal, and using some positions for 
sexual intercourse rather than others, have all been 
thought to increase the likelihood of conceiving a 
son rather than a daughter.  There is even some 
research support for the effectiveness of certain 
‘folk’ methods of selecting the sex of a baby: 
bananas and breakfast cereal may increase the 
chances of conceiving a son, though not by very 
much; whereas limiting caloric intake may make a 
daughter more likely.1 
Whether or not these ‘folk’ methods work, many 
people would find nothing to object to in these 
ways of attempting to influence the sex of your 
baby, and certainly wouldn’t support any moves to 
make such practices illegal.  But nowadays there 
are far more effective methods of choosing the sex 
of your baby, such as embryo selection and sperm 
sorting, and some, perhaps many, people have 
reservations when they consider the use of these 
clinical procedures for sex selection.
Some of the methods which could be used to 
ensure that parents get a child of the sex they 
want do indeed raise significant moral issues, the 
most obvious one being abortion of a fetus of the 
unwanted sex.2 But there are other less obviously 
problematic clinical methods of sex selection, such 
as embryo selection, where a number of embryos 
are created from the parents’ eggs and sperm 
outside the womb, by in vitro fertilisation, and only 
ones of the desired sex are chosen for implantation 
into the mother; or sperm sorting, which is a 
method of ensuring that only sperm which are likely 
to produce male babies are used to impregnate the 
mother.3 Neither of these methods raises quite the 
same moral issues as abortion but nonetheless 
some people are reluctant to countenance sex 
selection even by these means.  This suggests that 
they find something morally problematic about sex 
selection itself, even if the means of producing it 
aren’t themselves totally objectionable.4
What, if anything, is wrong with choosing the sex of 
your children?  The fact that some people object to 
this practice isn’t, of course, enough to show that 
it’s wrong – we need to look at the reasons that 
they give for the view that it’s morally unacceptable, 
and also at the reasons that other people give for 
disagreeing with them, and for supporting this 
choice for those parents who want it.
Reasons for sex selection: medical and 
social
In the UK, sex selection (specifically sex selection 
by means of embryo selection) is allowed only 
for ‘medical reasons’: i.e. in order to allow ‘at 
risk’ parents to be confident that their child will 
be born free from serious sex-linked diseases 
or disabilities, such as muscular dystrophy or 
haemophilia.  Sex selection of embryos for any 
other reason (sometimes known as ‘social’ sex 








Is it the method – the means used to achieve 
sex selection - that people object to, or is it 
the goal of sex selection itself which seems so 
morally dubious?   
Roger Highfield, ‘Diet before pregnancy can affect baby’s 
sex, new research suggests’, The Telegraph, 23rd April 2008.
Ian Sample, ‘Bananas and cereal – scientists reveal what little 
boys are made of: Pregnancy diet influences baby’s gender, 
study says fewer calories mean greater chance of a girl’, The 
Guardian, 23rd April 2008.
Sex selection is neither specifically prohibited nor allowed by 
the Abortion Act 1967.  See the following for an interesting 
discussion of the legal status of sex selective abortion in 
Great Britain.  (Different law applies in Northern Ireland.)  Sally 
Sheldon, ‘Abortion for reason of sex: correcting some basic 
misunderstandings of the law’, Abortion Review, 1st March 
2012.
http://www.abortionreview.org/index.php/site/article/1143/
According to the HFEA, “The only method of sperm sorting 
that is currently permitted in the UK is flow cytometry, which 
uses fluorescent dye to separate sperm carrying male 
chromosomes from those carrying female ones.  This method 
is not 100% reliable, so it is not used in practice.”
 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/pgd-sex-selection.html.
Some people believe that even very early human embryos 
have a strong right to life.  Such people are generally 
opposed to all embryo selection techniques, regardless of 
the purpose to which they are put, and indeed to all forms 
of IVF (since this normally involves creating some ‘spare’ 
embryos which aren’t implanted).  Believing in the embryo’s 
right to life however is not a reason to oppose other forms of 
sex selection (e.g. through sperm sorting, or if we could find 
a drug for prospective parents that dramatically improved 
their chances of having a girl).  For this reason, the status 
of the embryo is not something examined in any detail 
here; sex selection needn’t involve embryo selection and 
arguments against embryo selection therefore don’t apply to 
all (possible) forms of sex selection.
But what grounds are there for this prohibition? 
What makes the practice so objectionable?  In 
trying to answer that question, we’ll be working 
with an important background principle, namely 
that
One important kind of reason in the context of sex 
selection and elsewhere is harm:  is sex selection 
sufficiently harmful (and, if so, to whom) to count 
as a good reason for preventing parents who want 
to choose the sex of their child from doing so? 
But there may be other reasons too, not directly 
connected with harming people, which are worth 
looking at.
Before we look at the reasons against permitting 
sex selection, we should first consider why it is 
that some parents do very much want to choose 
the gender of their next child.  One very powerful 
reason is to avoid having a child with a serious 
sex-linked disease or disability.  Some diseases 
are genetically transmitted, but only to children of 
a particular gender, so that though children of the 
opposite gender may carry the disease-producing 
gene, they won’t actually suffer from the disease, 
though they may pass it on to their own children. 
Haemophilia, in which the blood’s ability to clot 
and hence prevent extended bleeding after injury 
is compromised, is a case like this; although girls 
may carry and transmit the damaged gene, only 
boys actually contract haemophilia. Parents who 
know that they themselves carry the haemophilia 
gene may want to ensure that they have a girl 
child, in order not to inflict this painful, debilitating 
and sometimes fatal disease on a boy child.  The 
law in the UK recognises and allows sex selection 
(through embryo selection) for this kind of reason.
Even where there’s no medical reason for considering 
sex selection, parents may nonetheless have a 
strong preference for having a child of a particular 
sex, either boy or girl, and there can be a wide 
variety of reasons for this preference.  Sometimes 
there’s a background cultural privileging of one sex 
over another, leading parents to feel that a child of 
that sex is more important and therefore more worth 
having.  Sometimes individual parents strongly 
want to have the kind of relationship they feel will 
only be possible with a child of one sex rather than 
another.  This is not necessarily because children 
of that sex are felt to be more important, but simply 
in recognition of the fact that the sexes differ, and 
may offer different possible kinds of parent-child 
relationships.   These parental feelings may be very 
strong indeed: women who already have several 
sons and very much want a daughter may express 
their feelings in terms of an overwhelming desire 
for a girl, and for a mother-daughter relationship 
different from that which is possible with their sons, 
much-loved though they are.
Consider, for example, the following remarks 
(reported in The Sun newspaper) from a woman 
who has five sons but is desperate to add a girl to 
their family:
Similarly, another woman writing on In-gender.com 
says:
In the face of these strong feelings, and in the 
light of the principle mentioned above –  that we 
shouldn’t stop people from doing what they want 
to do unless there’s a good reason for it –  we need 
to consider carefully what reasons there might be 






we shouldn’t condemn people, or prevent 
them from doing what they want to, unless we 
can give a good reason for doing so.
Don’t get me wrong, my boys are 
my world and I love them to pieces. 
It’s not about not wanting my boys. 
It’s about wanting a girl to join them. 
I’ve already chosen the name for my 
long-awaited girl - Patience ... My 
boys don’t like shopping and couldn’t 
care less when I buy them surf style 
necklaces and trendy shirts. They 
don’t want pretty clothes; they want 
toy guns and computer games ... [but] 
I love my boys for who they are and 
embrace their characters.6
There will be no girl... I will never be 
the one helping my daughter decide 
what to wear, teaching her all the 
amazing stuff about the female body 
or sharing her life. I am very sad I will 
miss out on all this.
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as 
amended), Schedule 2 1ZA(c), allows embryonic sex selection 
to take place only if there is a “particular risk that any resulting 
child will have or develop (i) a gender-related serious physical 
or mental disability, (ii) a gender-related serious illness, or (iii) 
any other gender-related serious medical condition”.  Gender-
related conditions (as defined by the Act) include both those 
which only affect one sex and those which affect one sex 
significantly more than the other.
http://www.legislat ion.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/22/pdfs/
ukpga_20080022_en.pdf
Kim Willis, ‘Why I will use an illegal procedure to ensure I have 
a baby girl’, The Sun, 16th February 2011.
Objections to sex selection (1): bad 
consequences
When people are reluctant to see sex selection 
permitted, two reasons often seem particularly 
important to them.  First, they think that bad social 
consequences are likely to flow from allowing 
it, and second, they think that the motives and 
attitudes which lie behind the desire to have a child 
of a particular sex are morally dubious. We need to 
consider how persuasive these reasons are, and 
whether there’s good evidence to support them.
One of the main bad consequences that could 
follow from permitting sex selection is population 
sex imbalance (i.e. substantially more males than 
females, or females than males).  There is a fear 
that most parents who want to select the sex of 
their child will choose to have sons, and that this 
will lead to a population skewed in favour of male 
children, many of whom won’t be able to find 
partners when they grow up. Girl children (it is 
sometimes argued) may also suffer in the case of 
population imbalance, because if they’re relatively 
scarce, this may lead to their being treated as 
commodities to be bought (or kidnapped) and 
sold, rather than as full persons with their own 
preferences and rights.
In some countries where sex selection is 
widely practised it has indeed led to population 
imbalance.7 For example, in China in 2005, it was 
estimated that more than a million ‘extra’ males 
were born and that the number of males under 
the age of 20 exceeded the number of females by 
around 32 million.
Similar problems are reported in parts of India and 
in South Korea.8  However, this isn’t enough to show 
that it should be banned in the UK.  Such evidence 
as there is suggests that unfettered sex selection 
wouldn’t in fact lead to a skewed population in 
the UK, even though it has done so in some other 
countries.9 The likely consequences of a policy 
of permitting sex selection are highly context-
sensitive: they vary from one culture or country to 
another, with differing cultural features leading to 
very different outcomes.  In cultures where sons 
are strongly favoured, and where there’s a strong 
commitment to heterosexual monogamy within 
the framework of marriage, then permitting sex 
selection may indeed lead, and in some cases has 
already led, to imbalance in the population.  But 
the UK is not overall such a culture, and so the bad 
effects which a sex-selection policy might have 
or has had elsewhere needn’t happen here. Bad 
effects from the policy elsewhere aren’t enough to 
show that it should be banned here.
There are ethnic subgroups in the UK who do 
possess the cultural features which favour the 
production of an imbalanced population.10 But this 
result won’t necessarily affect the majority of people 
in the UK, since members of such subgroups may 
choose to have children with other members of the 
same group.  If they do marry outside their sub-
group, then these cultural features are likely to be 
diluted; if they don’t do so, then the population 
imbalance will only occur inside that sub-group. 
And though that imbalance may well be harmful to 
the members of that group, that doesn’t seem a 
sufficient reason for constraining the reproductive 













In some Chinese provinces, there are more 
than 130 boys under 5 years for each 100 girls.
In any case as the examples of India and China 
show, legal prohibition does not guarantee that 
sex selection will not take place; it appears to 
have occurred in those countries despite laws 
prohibiting fetal sex determination and sex-
selective abortion.12
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Furthermore, banning sex selection can cause 
so-called ‘reproductive tourism’: the practice of 
seeking treatment overseas in order to escape 
restrictions in one’s own country.13 Indeed, there is 
evidence now that prospective parents from the UK 
have been travelling to the USA, where it’s possible 
to access sex selection procedures, though at 
considerable cost.14 The willingness of prospective 
parents to seek sex selection elsewhere if it isn’t 
available at home suggests that prohibition may 
not be very effective and one might argue that if 
people are going to access sex selection anyway 
then we may as well allow them to do this in their 
own country within a properly regulated healthcare 
system, rather than forcing them to suffer the cost, 
inconvenience, and risks of treatment overseas.15
This argument has some force but is not a decisive 
argument for allowing sex selection.  Why not? 
One reason is that, even if it is often circumvented 
by people going abroad, the UK ban on sex 
selection may still be partially effective, sufficient 
to discourage many people from taking steps to 
choose the sex of their baby (for example, those 
who can’t afford the time or money needed to travel 
overseas).  A second (more important) reason is 
that, if it could be shown that sex selection were 
seriously morally wrong, then we might still be 
justified in banning it even if that ban could be 
circumvented by people going overseas.  For when 
something is seriously morally wrong (the sexual 
exploitation of children, for example) we may still 
have good reason to ban it here even if people can 
evade that ban by going to other parts of the world 
where it’s allowed or tolerated.  So this argument 
about sex selection and ‘reproductive tourism’ 
may well depend on the more fundamental 
question of whether sex selection actually is 
ethically objectionable.  Concerns about the rise 
of ‘reproductive tourism’ will only provide us with a 
good reason to allow sex selection, if sex selection 
is not itself seriously morally wrong or harmful.
Irrespective of the possibilities of ‘reproductive 
tourism’, however, it seems clear that banning sex 
selection is not guaranteed to eliminate it, and 
permitting it may not have the bad effect of creating 
population imbalance. In addition, concerns 
about population sex imbalance could be dealt 
with through regulatory measures: for example, 
we could require clinics providing sex selection 
procedures to balance each couple selecting a 
boy with another couple selecting a girl, such that 
each sex selection clinic generated roughly equal 
numbers of boys and girls.  
So even if there are legitimate worries about 
population imbalance, it doesn’t seem that we 
would need to forbid sex selection in order to deal 
with them. 
Objections to sex selection (2): bad 
motives
Concerns about population imbalance are however 
only one kind of objection to choosing the sex of 
your child; there are other quite different ones 
which focus on the motives and attitudes of those 
who want to make such choices.
Is this a convincing objection to sex selection? 
There are many other gifts that life can bring us 
and we don’t always think that there’s anything 
objectionable about choosing some aspects of 
these over others: think of a person with many 
talents who reluctantly but definitely chooses 
to become an artist rather than a scientist, even 
though she has the capability to do either.  There’s 
nothing morally problematic about her consciously 
choosing between these different ‘gifts’ and we 
wouldn’t expect anyone to make such important 
Alternatively, we could encourage or require 
sex selecting parents to donate any viable 
spare embryos to others who need them, thus 
almost completely eliminating any unbalancing 
effects, while also benefitting the recipients 
of the embryos and allaying some people’s 
concerns about embryos being ‘discarded’.
Firstly some people feel that children are 
a great gift to us, and argue that we should 
accept them as they are, without trying to 
determine their features too closely.
To appreciate children as gifts 
is to accept them as they come, 
not as objects of our design or 
products of our will or instruments 
of our ambition. Parental love is 
not contingent on the talents and 
attributes a child happens to have.16
‘Cross-border reproductive healthcare’ would be a more 
accurate expression.
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Obviously some countries’ healthcare systems are better 
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additional risk will vary considerably, depending on where the 
prospective parents choose to go.
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choices at random, based on the toss of a coin. 
So even if something is a gift, it may be acceptable 
consciously to choose some aspects of it over 
others, or to choose one gift over another. Perhaps 
the same might be said of (as yet non-existent) 
future children.  Whichever one is eventually born 
should be cherished and cared for but – before any 
child is created – there’s not necessarily anything 
wrong with having a preference for one possible 
gift over another.
However all education – moral, intellectual, 
practical – will have some effect on the child’s 
character, and we can’t really hope to avoid 
shaping our children in some ways rather than 
other ways.  Parents commonly bring their children 
up to share their own religion, or lack of it; to find 
enjoyment in reading certain kinds of books (or not) 
and in playing or following certain kinds of sports 
(or not); to have strong commitments to some 
values (such as honesty or kindness) or perhaps to 
other ones (such as competitive success or sexual 
modesty).  In each of these cases, some ways of 
developing are made easier and more likely for the 
child, and other ways are made harder and more 
alien.   If this were to count as an argument against 
sex selection, then it would count as an argument 
against a huge swathe of other parental practices, 
which are impossible to control, and where it would 
be undesirable even to attempt to do so. Unless we 
are to remove autonomy from a large area of the 
lives of parents and their children then we have to 
accept that when parents open up some avenues 
for development for their children then they’ll also 
and inevitably close off some other ones.
How is it sexist? Because, so it is thought, it relies 
either on beliefs about the innate superiority of the 
selected sex, or at the very least on stereotyped 
views about the sexes, without which the choice 
of one sex rather than the other would be hard 
to understand.  People prefer to have a boy, say, 
because they associate boys with physical energy 
and intellectual ambition, and associate girls on the 
other hand with domestic virtues such as tidiness 
and gentleness and affection.  But such views are 
unwarranted, so the argument goes: they’re the 
product of discriminatory attitudes to women, and 
indeed it’s sometimes claimed that permitting a 
practice like sex selection, supposedly driven by 
stereotypical views, actually encourages sexism 
and discrimination against women elsewhere.
But this argument is not an entirely persuasive one. 
People may prefer a child of one sex rather than the 
other without believing in the innate superiority of 
that sex – they may simply like some of the features 
associated with children of that sex, or they may 
value the kind of relationship that they think will be 
possible with a child of the sex they favour.  Or 
they may simply want to have the experience of 
bringing up a child of a particular sex because they 
already have the experience of rearing children of 
the other sex.17 This is what happens in cases of 
family balancing, where parents who already have 
more than one child of one sex seek to have a child 
of the other sex.17 There need be nothing sexist 
in such an aim; it may in fact be a clear case of 
valuing diversity. (We’ll return to the issue of family 
balancing below.)
None of this is to deny that sex selection may in 
some, perhaps many, cases be driven by sexist 
attitudes.  But even where this is so, it’s not clear 
that this form of sexism causes serious harm to 
any specifiable individuals. Sexism which isn’t 
substantially harmful, while still of course morally 
objectionable, isn’t necessarily bad enough to 
warrant a legal ban on the practice of sex selection, 
with all the implications for reproductive liberty 
that that would involve, along with the monetary, 
practical, and social costs of policing (and, in some 
cases, criminalising) doctors and parents.
However there’s one worry about sexist attitudes 
which does claim that the sexism involved in sex 
selection would significantly harm other people. 
This is the view that, even if sex selection in this 
country wouldn’t lead to population imbalance or 
be harmful to specific individuals here, it would 
have a damaging effect on countries where bad 
outcomes of that kind were more likely.  It would, in 
short, set a bad example, and could lead to serious 
population imbalance and the growth of sexism 
elsewhere.
This claim is a directly factual one, about the effect 
on other places of our permitting sex selection 
here, but there are good reasons to doubt whether 
it’s true.  As was mentioned earlier, sex selection is 
currently being widely practised in other parts of the 




A rather different kind of concern is expressed 
in the view that parents who try to choose the 
sex of their child are overly controlling, and 
are closing off avenues for the child’s future 
development.  
Yet another objection to sex selection is the 
claim that it is sexist, and hence discriminatory. 
Bonnie Steinbock, ‘Sex Selection not obviously wrong’, 




bad consequences have in fact already occurred. 
The presence of our supposedly good example of 
not permitting it doesn’t seem to be acting as a 
major influence on such cases, nor does it seem 
to have prevented the widespread occurrence of 
seriously sexist attitudes to women.  Our practices 
here may simply not be particularly influential 
elsewhere.  It may well be that people in China or 
India or Korea know little and care less about what 
the UK laws on sex selection are; and even if they 
did know we shouldn’t assume that they would 
have any desire to copy them – on the contrary, 
there might in some places be a reaction against 
such laws on general anti-Western grounds.
There’s one final worry about social sex selection 
which we should consider: some groups are hostile 
to it because they regard it as eugenics, which they 
see as always being wrong.18 It’s difficult however 
to see how this classification can be correct. 
Although ‘eugenics’ can be defined in various 
ways, the core feature of most definitions is that 
eugenics is the attempt to improve the human 
gene pool.   But social sex selection doesn’t seem 
to involve anything like this.  Sex selecting parents 
don’t seem concerned about the whole gene pool 
at all (and they almost certainly don’t desire an 
all-male or all-female population).  Rather, their 
motives are, in a sense, more selfish than that: they 
simply want or prefer a boy or a girl because they 
think that they (or perhaps their families) will be 
better off, happier, with a child of that sex.  In fact 
interestingly it’s medical sex selection (selection to 
avoid sex-linked genetic disorders) which is more 
vulnerable to the charge of eugenics, since that 
form of sex selection really is an attempt to reduce 
the incidence of genetically-determined disease 
in the population, but many people find this less 
morally problematic than social sex selection (as 
is reflected in the present legal position, which 
permits sex selection for the purposes of avoiding 
genetic disorders).19 
Family balancing: is it a special case?
Let’s now consider the case of sex selection for 
family balancing, where parents who don’t have a 
child of one particular sex want to select for that 
sex, in order to balance their family: e.g., a mother 
with three daughters may decide that she really 
wants a son.  It’s sometimes thought that this 
form of sex selection is free of the worries about 
population imbalance and colluding with sexism 
which arise in other cases of sex selection.  Could 
we perhaps justify permitting family balancing 
cases, alongside medical ones, while still banning 
other cases of social sex selection?  
We can only justify a difference in our practice here 
if it’s clear that family balancing is morally different 
from ‘regular’ social sex selection.  But this isn’t at 
all obvious.  It’s true that family balancing cases 
are unlikely to lead to population imbalance in the 
UK, but then (as has been mentioned) the evidence 
suggests that regular social sex selection won’t 
lead to that imbalance anyway (and if it did, we 
could deal with the problem by regulation).  It’s 
also true that family balancing practices won’t set 
a bad, sexist example for countries which would be 
threatened by population imbalance but, as we’ve 
already seen, our own practices in this area probably 
aren’t particularly influential elsewhere anyway. 
Finally, although family balancing considerations 
needn’t be driven by sexist attitudes, in some 
cases they may be, just as other types of social sex 
selection may be: we simply can’t say in advance 
which requests will be driven by sexist beliefs and 
which won’t. 
So it doesn’t seem that sex selection for family 
balancing is so very different, morally speaking, 
from ‘regular’ social sex selection.  Hence it would 
be hard to justify a policy which favoured one but 
not the other.
So such sexism as might be involved in the 
use of sex selection in this country doesn’t 
seem harmful enough to ground a plausible 
case for legal prohibition, even though, 
where the sexism occurs, it would be morally 
objectionable. 
So while some family balancers will just desire 
a mixture of boys and girls without being in 
any way sexist, we can also imagine less 
innocent cases in which (for example) a sexist 
father with three daughters thinks of them as 
a disappointment and as inferior to boys and 
decides that he can’t stand the prospect of 
‘yet another girl’.  
See for example comments by Anthony Ozimic (Society for 
the Protection of Unborn Children) speaking on a recent Voice 
of Russia radio debate (‘UK parents are leaving Britain to 
choose sex of unborn baby’), 4th September 2012.
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A much fuller treatment of these and other issues connected 
with eugenics can be found in Stephen Wilkinson, Choosing 
Tomorrow’s Children (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
especially chapter 6.
Conclusions
Sex selection may have significant negative 
consequences in some countries and cultures and, 
where these are likely to occur, they must be taken 
seriously as objections to the practice.  But there’s 
no reason to think that such consequences (in 
particular, population sex imbalance) would occur 
in the UK, and hence no reason to ban it on those 
grounds here.  Sex selection may sometimes be 
driven by sexist attitudes, but it needn’t be, and 
often isn’t, and it would be unfair simply to assume 
that everyone who wishes to choose the gender 
of their baby is a sexist. Even where there are 
sexist beliefs and attitudes in play (such as gender 
stereotyping by parents), sex selection is unlikely 
to be substantially harmful in the UK context so, 
although such cases may be morally objectionable, 
that isn’t (on its own) a strong enough reason to 
prohibit the practice – we don’t generally expect 
or want law to enforce morality in every case. 
However, the fact that legal prohibition wouldn’t be 
justified in the UK doesn’t mean that sex selection 
should be paid for by the taxpayer, nor does it 
warrant a complete lack of regulation: indeed a 
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